


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FAITH AND FREEDOM



A Journal of Progressive
Religion



Volume 2
Part 1

AUTUMN
1948

Number
Four

FAITH AND FREEDOM

A JOURNAL OF PROGRESSIVE RELIGION

Vol. II. Part I AUTUMN NUMBER OCTOBER 1948

Editor: E. SHIRVELL PRICE, M.A.

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LAUNCHED AT THE INSTANCE OF THE OLD
STUDENTS' ASSOCIATION OF MANCHESTER
COLLEGE, OXFORD, WITH THE FINANCIAL
SUPPORT OF THE DR. DANIEL JONES TRUST

Published at the Priestley Hall, City Square, Leeds 1
ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION—(Three Issues) 3/- post free.
Single Copies 1/-, add 2d. for postage.

288.4
F147
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Whither Europe?

E. L. ALLEN, M.A., PH.D., D.D.

TO the question : What is Europe? there are two possible answers, the first in political and geographical terms, the second employing the language of the spirit. Europe, we may say, is the stretch of land between the Atlantic Ocean in the West and the Ural mountains in the East; it is also the peoples who inhabit this region. To be sure, they are divided into separate and rival nationalities between which war has been endemic. But while these nations have fought at times with fury, they have seldom done so with an easy conscience. Always there has been among them some sense that Europe is a unity and that what disrupts that unity ought not to be. It is from this portion of the earth's surface, moreover, that the white races have gone out to conquer, to colonise, and to transplant their civilisation in other lands.

But Europe is also a cultural and spiritual heritage. As such it is not confined to a single continent, but America, Australasia, and South Africa draw with it upon a common tradition. That tradition is compounded of three elements, classical antiquity, the religion of the Bible, and modern science. He who says Europe in this sense means Homer and Virgil, Isaiah and St. Paul, Galileo and Newton. It is from such progenitors as these that Europe has received that passion for freedom, that will to create institutions and achieve results in the actual world, and that insatiable craving for knowledge which distinguish her civilisation from all others. To-day her ideals of law and political liberty are among her major exports to the awakening peoples of the East, along with her machinery and her armaments.

To whichever definition of Europe we attach ourselves, we must admit that her present situation is one of grave peril. Politically speaking, she is no longer the world's commanding centre. The power which she so long exercised has now passed from her to America and Russia. Even should she at this late hour fashion for herself some political unity, that would only stave off the evil day for a little while. The growing manpower and the well-nigh inexhaustible resources of the two Powers would soon subordinate her again. Nor is this all. As we can look into the future, we can surmise that Asia will not much longer remain quiescent, that China and India will in time play a part in the world's affairs which will far surpass that of a Europe weakened by two wars.

Again, long before those wars, the self-confidence of European man was shaken by the discovery that Asia has its two civilisations, older by far than his and operating with standards strange to him. For thousands of years men in China and India have looked on life with other eyes than ours, and even to this day there are those among them who, like Gandhi, having learned what the West has to offer, abandon it without regret for the ancient wisdom of the East. Time was when we were humanity and our continent the world; the rest existed only to learn from us, perhaps indeed to enrich us. But we are aware now that other races have their own classics and their own bibles, and are not disposed to abandon them for ours. We no longer feel that our culture is of absolute value; it has been called in question, and we are inwardly uncertain of ourselves as the result.

Such is the analysis of Europe's heritage and plight which Karl Jaspers, Professor of Philosophy at Heidelberg and one of the leaders in the new Germany, offers us in his *Europa der Gegenwart*, one of the latest of his writings to reach this country. His philosophy has always been a summons to faith and courage in face of the ultimate hazards, and we look to see how he will apply it to this problem. He outlines for us three courses of action by which we may meet our destiny and still make Europe great.

One of these need only be touched on lightly, since he does not himself find it satisfying. It is that we should preserve with fidelity and devotion for the good of mankind at large what is precious in the European heritage, its cities and homes of learning, its art and literature. We may be, as it were, keepers of a museum to which men will come from the ends of the earth to learn and from which they will go home to live out what they have learned.

But something much more vigorous is clearly called for. The time has come when Europe can only hope to maintain her tradition of freedom as she shares it with all the world. She must take the lead in bringing into being a world-order in which the nations will surrender their sovereignties to the common good. What has been achieved on the small scale in the Swiss canton and in Anglo-Saxon democracy must now be achieved on the largest scale of all, that of the human race. Unity there must be and will be, if humanity is to survive; the only question left open for us to decide is whether it will take the form of world-empire, the rule of one nation imposing itself on the rest, or world-community, a society of nations bound together by mutual respect and common purposes.

How is this to be brought about? Jaspers answers that this is not merely the task of statesmen, but that the responsibility devolves in the last resort on each one of us. We have no right to say that we as individuals can do nothing, since it is always beyond our knowledge how God uses us. "If the individual does not bear in mind that he personally is concerned, and if he does not act as if the principles of his action are

to form the bases of a world that is yet to emerge, then the freedom of all is lost." "As is our intercourse with one another as individuals, so are the great organisations, parties, and states." By sincerity, open-mindedness, and respect for others in daily life we help to make the world-order of freedom and brotherhood for which we long.

But there is one third and still more important requirement. We may describe it as a rebirth of the religion which comes down to us in the Bible, so that this takes on a wholly new form, and one adequate to our time. While we acknowledge in the Christian Church a heritage from the past to which we are deeply indebted, yet no form which the Christian faith has so far assumed can content us. It may be magnificent, but it is not ours, and only by what is actually our own can we live in the end. Yet as we recall how the Bible has again entered into the life of the West, we need not doubt that it can do so in our own day. But to the Bible we owe everything, since even what we pit against it—our science, our philosophy, and our political idealism—is in the last resort a secularisation of something in it. "Without the Bible we return to chaos."

We need, therefore, a fresh appropriation of what it offers. We need to go back to the sources of our spiritual life, to use the Bible not as a depository of doctrine, but as a guide to the soul's encounter with God at the testing-places of life. It must speak to us again of one God over all, of His will of righteousness by which men and nations are judged, of the inescapable choice between good and evil, of our duty to shape the course of events instead of being shaped by it, of the deep meaning of pain and the tragic element in our experience, and of the courage to face even the most perplexing situations. As we return to the sources so, as we refresh ourselves by deep draughts from this spring, we shall learn how Europe still may live and be great.

But is it perhaps too late? That question remains. Inertia holds the mass of men in its grip, they have suffered so much that they want only to forget. But if we surrender to this mood, we are lost indeed. Where indifference is to-day there will be disaster to-morrow.

But it is not on this note that the argument closes. "If we grow dizzy as we gaze into the abyss—and we must anticipate the worst—it is still true that when all passes, God remains. It is enough that Transcendence is. And even Europe is not for us the final reality. We become Europeans in such measure as we become really and truly men, that is, men who draw their being from the God from whom we came forth and to whom we return."

Reconstruction—The Human Responsibility

H. J. McLACHLAN, B.A., B.D.

Probably at no time in the history of civilised society has the challenge to the individual man to assume personal responsibility for the future progress of mankind been more insistent than it is to-day. The trends of social habit and national policies between the two wars impelled men increasingly in the direction of mass thinking, feeling, and willing. The characteristic life of a largely urban population with its mechanised industry, its commercialised amusements and dehumanized relationships, threatened to dispose of individual initiative and submerge the sense of individual responsibility. Moreover, the recent world-upheaval seems, to no small extent, to have undermined people's moral and spiritual resistance. We are now seeing the effect of that complete regimentation of life which total war fastens on a nation; a listlessness, a disenchantment which goes to the roots of personal being, withering spiritual vitality and sapping moral awareness. Some fitful light of individualism and true humanity flickers or gleams for a moment. But too often it is quenched by propaganda or by the impatience of those who fondly imagine that there are short-cuts to social and international recovery.

From time to time, it is true, men are still stirred by pious emotions, moved inconsequently by myth, touched momentarily to the quick by national emergency or the spectacle of human suffering. Yet the mood passes. Imaginative sympathy is quickly extinguished. There seems to be no way of bridging the gap thence to moral purpose and endeavour. To realise our responsibility to God and man seems too hard a feat. . . . How sad the reflection, but how true it is that the sense of moral obligation and personal accountability for actions has grown so feeble just at a time when our physical control of Nature has put into our hands the key to untold human good! Doubtless, the predominant secularisation of all life has weakened the sense of individual vocation. It has destroyed both man's awareness of eternal ends and values and his feeling of an imperative need to respond to life affirmatively and constructively. And whilst it has left, for the most part, a spiritual desert in men's lives and called that "progress," secularism has signally failed to generate those qualities of mutual responsibility and service which are essential to man's social and spiritual happiness.

Faced with this situation, with the pressing need to rebuild the "Waste Land" of our physical and spiritual environment, to provide warmth and food for the body and re-clothe men in their rightful minds, nothing less than a revolution in thought, feeling, and action is demanded. The individual, so dragooned and depressed by modern conditions, must

be raised and set upon his feet; his status in society must be restored; his freedom fortified; his sense of responsibility revived and stimulated. That feeling of powerlessness and lack of purpose which leaves him to-day so paralysed and passive must be supplanted by worthier conceptions and active affections. Fundamental to this task is the individual human response to the situation confronting us. Basic is the personal decision for or against a course of action.

The method of Jesus, it will be remembered, was to confront a man with a decision for or against the Kingdom of God. To each individual man or woman the choice was presented in somewhat differing form, but the effect was the same. A man was compelled to realise his moral accountability, was forced to make a personal response to the challenge of the Kingdom. Those who would follow Jesus needs must decide against their lower desires and selfish inclinations. Too strong for the "rich young ruler" were those "great possessions" which hung round his neck like a millstone. Too clamant were the calls of hearth and home, of business for other would-be disciples. But to the house of Zacchaeus came "salvation," for, despised taxgatherer though he was, he made a personal response to the challenge of the Master. He "made good his right to be a pilgrim." Not unlike this is the situation to-day. The call comes to the individual to realise his true individuality and personal responsibility.

A fresh and deep awareness of personal responsibility is essential to the work of reconstruction. Without a purgation of individual feeling and a regeneration of the individual will, the most "efficient" of blue prints for a New Order must prove a delusion. In point of fact, we are coming to see that this problem of the healing of our civilisation will be solved not in the realm of thought but in the region of the will. Here Duns Scotus' maxim applies with special force: "Voluntas est superior intellectu." The radical reconstruction of our life is impossible without a spiritual conversion of the will.

"Knowledge we ask not—knowledge Thou hast lent,
But Lord, the will, there lies our bitter need,
Give us to build above the deep intent
The deed, the deed."

How then, we may ask, is the individual man to realise (or actualise) his responsibility as an individual and a person, thus opposing to the prevailing secularism and mass-existence a true and revolutionary corrective?

Obviously, the prime necessity is the recovery of the status of the individual in society, the realisation (and expression of that realisation in community-life) that individual men, women, and children are the growing-point of all community, the seed and fount of all progress, above all, fellow-workers with, and children of, God.

E. D. P. Kelsey, in his *The Dynamic of Reconstruction* (1943) has

warned us that there is a false and a true individualism, as well as a false and a true collectivism. "We have built an altar," he declares, "to a false individualism and slain upon it the true sense of community; we now build an altar to a false collectivism and slay upon it a true individualism." We cannot take this warning too seriously. Indeed, it may be stated as an axiom that both community and fully-rounded individual personality are incomplete and imperfect without each other. It is in our mutual and inter-acting relationships with other men that we are fully personal. In the balance of freedom and obligation, in the fostering of truly personal character and individual fulfilment a society becomes a true community.

Our aim must be to encourage the formation of character and personality, avoiding the pit-falls of regimentation and uniformity. In this respect, our educational system is badly in need of reform. It must be so ordered as to combat the growth of the "mass-mind" and promote initiative and resourcefulness. Our churches and other spiritual agencies must direct their liberating influences upon both children and adults, avoiding abstractions and generalisations like the plague, for these bedevil our problems and falsify the world in which we live.

An observation of the "judicious Hooker" (*Eccl. Polity* v, 9) is apposite here:—"General rules, till their limits be fully known, are, by reason of the manifold secret exceptions which lie hidden in them, no other to the eye of man's understanding than cloudy mists cast before the eye of common sense." . . . "With gross and popular capacities nothing doth more prevail than unlimited generalities because of their plainness at the first sight: nothing less with men of exact judgment, because such rules are not safe to be trusted over far." Men must learn to bring all things to the bar of the concrete, to personalize their problems, to humanize them. They will not then be led astray by ignorance and prejudice or made to feel content with conditions which cry out for reform and for which they cannot escape a share of responsibility. When the problems of unemployment, poverty, war and the like are personalized, made vivid and vital by the knowledge that men, women, and children are their unfortunate victims, men begin to care, and caring proceed to act. Refusing generalisations, a man will increase his sensitivity and imaginative sympathy, until he responds to circumstances in a fully personal way. The sufferings and difficulties of others will seem as real to him as his own private problems. He will be as solicitous for others' happiness and peace as he is for his own. (Schweitzer's account of how he came to the decision to go out to Africa as a medical missionary is one of the most apt illustrations of this process, as indeed his whole life is a wonderful commentary on this very subject of the realisation of human responsibility.)*

* See *My Life and Thought*, pp 106-107.

"Caring," wrote Baron von Hugel, "is the greatest thing; caring matters most." Now "caring" is a function of human personality—the characteristic of a fully individualized man or woman. A crowd cannot care; a group of people, however conscientious, is incapable of feeling personal responsibility. The group-psychologists have drawn our attention to the striking loss of all sense of responsibility on the part of a crowd. This evil trend we have to reverse—by the creation of true individuals, by proclaiming and inculcating a positive conception of life's dignity and worth. Indeed, perhaps what is wanted to-day is nothing less than a new puritanism with its emphasis upon human responsibility and decision for the kingdom of God, the divine sovereignty over all life. And here the importance of moral freedom and choice cannot be over-estimated. The individual occupies a key-position within the community. He has a great role to play, which no one and no-thing else can perform for him—neither Church nor State, neither charitable organisation nor humanitarian institution, neither powers beneath nor powers above. In God's economy the individual person is the operative and co-operative factor, and if he abdicate, all is confusion. "The individual may not shift his responsibilities on to 'Destiny,' nor yet on to God," writes Sir Herbert Samuel in *Belief and Action*. "Destiny is a figment; and the divine element in the world, as Plato held, is not coercive, but persuasive. If God were overtly active, constantly directing, man could be passive and nothing more. Because God is reticent, man has scope . . ." "All depends upon man's own action." In other words, we must take hold of life and mould it by an act of will, achieving freedom from futility by the very proper combination of faith and works.

The key to the problem of Reconstruction is the application of faith to life in society and in the natural world as God has created it. It is the achievement of meaning and purpose in all we do, the acknowledgment that life is a unity, that the whole of existence may be sacramental and minister to the high ends and values of faith. The mistake of evangelical religion in the past has been to separate and segregate the physical and spiritual, the secular and sacred, the natural and supernatural, to promote false dichotomies, when, in fact, the whole of creation lies within the hands of God.

The man of faith to-day must insist on the wholeness of life and the unity of mankind. All phases and activities of human life must fall within his purview. In especial, must he be concerned to foster a *true sense of community*. To strengthen the awareness of mutual obligation and the feeling of social responsibility (to some extent already re-born under the exigencies of total war) must be the aim of religion to-day and to-morrow.

In a physical world which is more and more thrusting men together into community, despite their prejudices, insularities, and nationalisms, men need wider vision of their social duty and a deeper realisation of belonging to a great unity than is almost anywhere apparent to-day.

Essential Christianity can give this vision and promote this realisation. For Christianity is just as much concerned with men in society as with individuals in their relationship to God. In fact, as we have hinted above, only in his social relationships can a man give positive expression to his faith. The test of a Christian Society is whether it makes it possible for men to live in healthy moral relationships with each other. If, as to-day, the existing order prevents men from living the truly Christian life, then there is need for radical reformation. Individuals and Society are to be redeemed contemporaneously or not at all. For life is one, and we are all bound in a tether. The question of the salvation of the individual soul is, ultimately, inseparable from that of the whole community.

Therefore, a pre-condition of Reconstruction is a widespread and heightened sense of Christian social responsibility. This may well lead to collective action by individuals to change laws, systems and institutions, under which our present community-life suffers and individual character is wasted and spoiled. But it also means—and this is crucial—the faithful discharge of ordinary human responsibilities in the spheres allotted to us. In being “faithful in a few things,” it is possible to make a very real contribution to Reconstruction and so to co-operate with God.

“Never,” writes Maritain, “shall we renounce the hope of a new Christendom, a new temporal order inspired by Christianity.” But he is quick to lay down the conditions for such an event, and they are challenging indeed. “The spiritual reintegration of the masses into Christianity is a primordial requirement for the healing of civilisation,” but “this reintegration is only to me *humanly* obtained by remoulding the social structure, according to justice and human dignity, and with the free co-operation of the labouring classes, in order to go beyond the capitalist system and the social cult of material goods and material power.” The second condition for the constructing of a new Christian temporal order is concerned with the question of *means*. And here Maritain forcefully underlines the argument of this paper. He places the individual person with his capacities for moral energy, spiritual firmness, personal courage, willingness to risk, and to suffer where he rightly belongs—at the business end of the Archimedean lever which will raise the world. He reminds us of the remarkable fact that in a dictatorship-state, a single man who can stand out and say “I do not agree” appears as an intolerable and most dangerous enemy. “Why, if there is not in Conscience, Honour, Truth, Patience and Love a certain hidden strength that totalitarian idols fear? We are stupid not to dare to fortify the terrific resources of this hidden strength.” More than stupid, we are criminally negligent.

A Unitarian Answer to Secular Naturalism

A. R. SHELANDER, of Sharon, Massachusetts.

All life is from within. Every organism, whether plant, animal or spiritual; whether individual or social; is a living whole because of the life within. A tree requires suitable environment, such as soil, air, moisture, warmth, light; but the life of the tree is from within the tree. Truth (reality as revealed to us) also is a living whole: A living word is a spoken or written word which serves as a vehicle of meaning (truth). A spoken or written word which conveys no meaning (truth) is dead. The spoken or written word is external. The meaning (truth) is internal. The spoken or written word which conveys a falsehood, "killeth"—poisons everyone who harbours it. The spoken or written word which conveys truth "giveth life." It was Saint Paul who gave currency to the expression, "The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life."—2 Cor. iii, 6. In the parable of the ten virgins, all had lamps (externals), but only five had oil (internals) in their lamps.

Religious faith is the life of a religious body. Lacking religious faith, a religious body is dead. There is a vast difference between "values"—things men value because they are thought to have worth—and religious faith.

Religious faith is not an hypothesis. No one would give his life for a hypothesis. but many have willingly suffered martyrdom for their religious faith. Religious faith is not belief unsupported by evidence. Religious faith is not the acceptance of certain dogmas on authority. Religious faith is not theism—the attempt to prove the existence of God by reasoning. Religious faith is not mere belief that there is a God—"the devils also believe, and tremble."—Jas. 2: 19. Religious faith is not an idea projected by the imagination. Religious faith is not an attitude of mind produced by the fear of punishment or the hope of reward.

Religious faith is primarily trust in God, accompanied by radiant joy. As we learn to know the nature of the sun through experiencing directly the warmth and light which radiate from it, and in no other way; so we learn to know the nature of God through experiencing directly the warmth of Love and the light of Truth, which radiate from Him. Trust in God is kept alive through constant communication between God and man: on the part of God, through revealing Himself as an ever flowing fountain of Love and Truth; and on the part of man, through prayer, the first faltering step of which is thankfulness to God "for His wonderful works to the children of men." Thankfulness to God thaws the heart of man and prepares it for the reception of Divine Love and Divine Truth, provided evil has been put away. Man has been provided with an inborn

hunger for the Living God, and finds no rest until he rests in Him. However, to go in search of God is to run away from Him; for, as all who walk in the way of life discover sooner or later, God woos the soul as a lover woos the beloved. "Faith," says Semyon L. Frank, "is akin to the blissful certainty of a secret love hidden from the world." Faith is the inward reality of religion; its outward expression is thinking, willing, neither one of which alone is religion.

The secular naturalistic philosophy which dominates Western Civilization, is a symptom of the spiritual disease which threatens to destroy Western Civilization. Secular Naturalism denies the existence of internals. It denies the existence (1) of purpose in the Universe, as anything more than a blind force pushing up from below; (2) of mind, as anything more than an epiphenomenon; (3) of truth, as anything more than current opinion: "In the instrumental theory," says Bertrand Russell (*Whither Mankind*, p. 72) "there is not a single state of mind which consists of knowing a truth—there is a way of acting, a manner of handling the environment, which is appropriate, and whose appropriateness constitutes what alone may be called knowledge, as these philosophers understand it. One might sum up the theory by a definition: To know something is to be able to change it as we wish. There is in this outlook no place for the beatific vision, nor for any notion of final excellence." (4) Of God, as anything more than the totality of the physical universe: "God as actually possessing deity does not exist," says S. Alexander (author of *Space, Time, and Deity*; quoted with approval by C. Lloyd Morgan, author of *Emergent Evolution*), "but God as the whole universe tending toward deity does exist . . . From all-pervasive space-time emerge in due historical order the inorganic, the organic and the mental, in all their ascending grades until the quality of deity is reached in some men." Briefly stated, what Mr. Alexander says, is, that God emerges from space-time and that man is the highest form God has actually attained. According to the teachings of Christianity this is satanism. When man puts himself in the place of God he becomes demonic. That God actually emerges is not a valid conclusion from the fact that particular things appear to emerge. In philosophy, putting a part, or a number of parts, or all of the parts, in the place of the whole, is a logical error: A living (organic) whole is more than a collection of its parts. In religion, putting a part, or a number of parts, or all of the parts in the place of the whole, is idolatry.

The notion that secular Naturalism is based upon scientific fact is not true. Secular Naturalism is based upon the assumption that space-time is self-existent—eternal—axiomatic. The validity of this assumption is denied by some of our top rank astrophysicists, who hold that space-time came into existence when the material universe came into existence, only a few trillion years ago; and that space-time and the material universe will both cease to exist in a matter of a few trillion years. Secular Naturalism,

which many propose to substitute for Christianity, is really a recrudescence of nature worship. In Greek mythology, Cronos (time), figures as a nature god who had long since been dethroned and replaced by Zeus, "the father of gods and men."

The exponents of secular Naturalism claim that, like science, it is empirical; and offer this as proof of its soundness. The fact is that secular Naturalism is not consistently empirical; and even if it were, this would not be proof of its soundness. In natural science the empirical method serves a useful purpose, but, as Bertrand Russell tells us (*History of Western Philosophy*, p. 834): "Our (scientific) knowledge of the physical world . . . is only abstract and mathematical." Furthermore, as the same Bertrand Russell said in a lecture at Harvard University in December, 1945: "Empiricism (as a philosophy) is self-refuting." By this he meant that under the rules governing the empirical method, the empiricist is debarred from making any "universal negative" statement, such as, that no knowledge can be gained by any other than the empirical method." Bertrand Russell said further: "There are no empiricists." By this he meant, as stated above, that "empiricism (as a philosophy) is self-refuting."

The charge here made against secular Naturalism is that, in many instances, the reasoning employed is unsound. Mr. Alexander's statement that "God as actually possessing deity does not exist," is an unwarranted assumption. The only evidence Mr. Alexander can adduce in support of it is, that it is congruent with his body of belief. The weakness of this evidence is, that Mr. Alexander's body of belief contains a number of other unwarranted assumptions.

The fact that many highly educated persons have adopted secular Naturalism as their philosophy of life does not prove that it is sound. Eduard C. Lindeman is reported to have said: "The more educated people are, the more difficult it seems to be for them to think straight." This is not as strange as it may seem at first glance. The stars shine brilliantly on an unclouded but otherwise dark night; but in the presence of artificial light, the light of the stars grows dim; despite the fact that the effective radius of the artificial light is infinitesimal compared to that of the stars. Similarly, the light of spiritual truth grows dim with too much dependence upon book learning, or too much occupation with material things, or too much love of self. Swedenborg (D.P.311) says that secular Naturalists "are like those who live in the basement of a house, and through the windows see only what is below the level of the ground," whereas the more mature spiritually "are like those who live in the house and see heaven through the windows." Education is a means, not an end in itself. Education exists to promote the good life. If it fails in this it is harmful. Science also is a means, not an end in itself. It too exists to promote the good life. If it fails in this it is harmful.

No discussion of religion or theology or philosophy or science can progress very far without coming to grips with the problem of the nature of knowledge. This problem has been discussed endlessly by every philosopher since Plato, by several before Plato, and recently, by a number of psychologists who hold that the problem belongs in the field of psychology. Many theories of knowledge have been propounded, but the last word has not been spoken. Here it is not possible to do more than offer a few scattered comments pertinent to the matter in hand :

(1) Secular Naturalism is right in affirming that knowledge is gained through sense perception and reasoning, but secular Naturalism is wrong in affirming that no knowledge can be gained in any other way. Alfred North Whitehead (*Nature and Knowledge*) says : "My quarrel with modern epistemology concerns its exclusive stress upon sense perception for the provision of data respecting nature. Sense perception does not provide the data in terms of which we interpret it."

(2) Every normal human being has a body of belief which has been built up in a variety of ways : through sense perception, reasoning, biological urges, mental urges, bent of will, parental influence, the influence of associates, education, reading, *et al.* Any or all of these beliefs may be sound, or they may be unsound. A person's body of belief serves as his frame of reference for every new idea which comes to his attention. Normally, if the new idea is congruous with his body of belief, it is incorporated with it. If the new idea is incongruous, it is either rejected, or the body of belief is revised and brought into congruence with it, or it is incorporated despite its incongruence. The last-mentioned alternative, however, results in a disturbed mental condition, for man is equipped with an unconscious mental urge to maintain his body of belief in congruence.

"The true business of philosophy," says John Cook Wilson, sometime Professor of Logic at Oxford (*Statement and Inference*, Vol. 2, p. 851), "seems to be to bring . . . belief to consciousness of itself."

(3) The knowing mind is one. Signals come to it through the five senses : sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, and through a number of other avenues. The eye does not see. It is the mind that sees. The eye is simply an instrument through which the brain receives nerve impulses which convey meaning (truth) to the mind.

(4) There are other sense organs besides the five mentioned. Bats fly safely in the dark, guided by the echo of sounds they themselves make, which are inaudible to us. Rattlesnakes have a special temperature sense, which enables them to detect the body warmth of animals at a distance, with sufficient accuracy to attack them in the dark. Flies and certain other insects are equipped with gyroscopes.

(5) Birds know how to build a nest, incubate their eggs, and feed their young. This knowledge is inborn. Calling it instinct is merely giving it a name. Man has a number of such inborn urges or promptings,

which serve to guide him on his journey through life. Urges like hunger for food, the mating urge, the urge to avoid danger, are thought to emerge in consciousness from the autonomic nervous system, which has its own central authority, and which functions chiefly below the threshold of consciousness.

(6) Certain so-called "inspirations," which many artists, poets, scientists, and other highly sensitive persons have experienced, are thought to have originated in that storehouse of past experiences, labelled "the unconscious." The unconscious, however, is more than a storehouse. A number of artists, poets, scientists, and other highly sensitive persons have testified that some of their most difficult problems have been solved, presumably by their unconscious, while they were sound asleep.

(7) That thought transference without material aids occurs, is indisputable. It bears a striking resemblance to radio, although the sending and receiving instruments and the medium of transmission are different. It is the nature of intelligent beings to be able to communicate with each other. All living tissue is sensitive. The skin is not a sense organ, but serves rather to insulate the body against what would otherwise be an intolerable jumble of impressions. The sense organs are specialized instruments for receiving only certain selected signals. If there are intelligent beings in other parts of this universe, as I firmly believe there are, and if human beings live after death, as I firmly believe they do, there exists the groundwork, at least, for a vast information service through direct thought transference. It is highly probable that the spiritual atmosphere is full of radio messages; and that we pick up those thoughts to which our mental receiving set is attuned.

(8) Meaning (truth) is not perceived by the physical senses, nor is it conceived by reflective thinking, nor is it a product of the imagination. Meaning (truth) is apprehended immediately, or through some super-sensuous instrumentality. There is no generally accepted term for the apprehension of truth. It is variously called intuition, insight, revelation. A. N. Whitehead says "Revelation is the primary characterization of all knowledge." There is no profit in quibbling about words. Function should always govern structure, never structure function. Meaning should always govern the word, never the word meaning. Although truth, beauty, goodness, joy, sorrow, soul, God are apprehended immediately, or through some super-sensuous instrumentality, as mentioned above, they are no less real than colours, sounds, tastes and smells; that is, the signals from them that reach us are no less dependable than the signals which we call colours, sounds, tastes and smells. To keep the record straight, it should be added that, in accordance with the Christian body of belief here advocated, God alone is real, in the sense that He alone is self-existent; all other so-called real things, including man, are derived, that is, created. Immediate experience is its own

evidence. All concepts and theories about reality, as experienced, are derivative and secondary. A concept has two limitations: (a) A concept is an abstraction: Being-in-love is an immediate experience. No concept exists, nor can one be invented, which will convey what it means for a pair of purehearted lovers to be in love, to one who has not had the experience, and is incapable of it. (b) A concept is static, like a still picture, whereas life is dynamic.

(9) Many persons of proved integrity have borne witness to the reality of Divine guidance—guidance by the Holy Spirit, which is the spirit of truth. All of these witnesses agree that the reality of Divine guidance can be tested, but only by a person who has the necessary preparation through having walked in the way of life.

It is the practical difference between secular Naturalism and Christianity that makes it a matter of vital concern to us in the present crisis. When man puts himself in the place of God, his self-interest (man's will to power) becomes his highest authority, and strife (hell) is brought into the world. It is only when man acknowledges and obeys a Right above self-interest (the will of the God of Truth, Love and Righteousness) that justice, security and prosperity become possible.

Western Civilization is sick and needs a doctor. A human being whose personality is split into two or more fragments is said to be insane. Western Civilization is split into factions seeking to destroy one another. This, too, is insanity. The members of the Third Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, held at Columbia University in 1942, confessed that they could not agree upon any remedy for the ills of our time which they characterized as "a period of intellectual confusion and moral and spiritual deterioration." The specific function of the Church in this year of grace, 1948, is to make whole (1) personalities that have been split into two or more fragments, and (2) communities, large and small, that have been split into factions seeking to destroy one another. Arnold Toynbee (*Yale Review*, Autumn, 1947, p. 5) tells us he has begun "to think of the churches (religions) as being ends in themselves, and 'as being ends also' of the antecedent civilizations, out of whose declines and falls the churches spring." They "would appear, in this light, to represent the first experiments in a new and higher species of society, rising above the level of the species called civilizations, as the latter, in their day, had risen above the level of the primitive societies."

Christianity, which is the most advanced form of religion on this planet, is a plan of salvation. It is the only plan thus far revealed, that can save the human race from self-destruction—from hell in this life and the next. By Christianity is not meant any of the misrepresentations that often pass for Christianity. Church members stand in constant danger of observing the outward forms of religion, and ignoring the weightier matters of the inner life. Such nominal Christians are referred to by Jesus as

being "like whited sepulchres which indeed appear beautiful outward, but are within full of dead men's bones, and all uncleanness."—*Matt.* xxiii, 27. Liberals who reject Christianity, although they are acquainted only with some ridiculous misrepresentation of it, make the mistake of throwing out the baby with the bath water.

The basic teachings of Christianity can be stated very simply. Jesus, the founder of Christianity, said: "A new commandment I give unto you, that ye love one another."—*John* xiii, 34. One of the disciples of Jesus helps us to understand the profound significance of these words by his declaration that "God is Love," and that "if we love one another, God dwelleth in us, and His Love is perfected in us."—*1 John* iv, 8-12.

The physical universe, so far as man is concerned, is a free gift. Man did not make it and is not responsible for its management. Man is free to use the unfathomable riches of the physical universe to serve his needs; but he is not free to waste these riches, without dire consequences to himself both materially and spiritually, and to others materially: A man's body can be injured by himself, by other men, and by untoward circumstances; but a man's soul can be injured only by his own unfaithfulness to God. Man's body, likewise, is a free gift. Man's body is made of light condensed into atoms—approximately 50 sextillion in number; the atoms organized into cells, organs, systems; and the whole operated and kept in repair by an unseen central authority, even during periods of unconsciousness.

In two respects man is made "in the image of God." (1) He possesses free will; that is, within definitely prescribed limits, he has the power of free choice; and even his refusal to choose, becomes his choice. He is free to choose the right or the wrong—to serve the purpose for which he was created, or to play truant and serve himself—with the one provision that he must assume responsibility for the consequences of whatever choices he makes, or fails to make, within the limits prescribed by his Maker. (2) He possesses understanding. As Emanuel Swedenborg has made clear, the will and the understanding are separate and distinct—the will being the receptacle of Divine Love and the understanding the receptacle of Divine Truth; nevertheless, they are as closely related as the heart and the lungs, or as the positive and the negative poles of a magnet. The one cannot exist without the other; they must be wedded, figuratively speaking, even to exist. The human embryo is endowed with a blind urge. After birth, when the senses have matured, this urge is called will. The will is the man. When it is unspoiled it is good will (love), and as such, related to that power by which all things are made; for, as already mentioned, "if we love one another, God dwelleth in us, and His Love is perfected in us." When both the will and the understanding are normally developed, the will purifies the understanding and the understanding enlightens the will. On the

other hand, if either remains undeveloped, this not only retards but tends also to corrupt both. Goethe says: "Love is ever the beginning of knowledge as fire is of light."

A. N. Whitehead, in one of his Lowell Lectures (*Religion in the Making*, p.16) says there are three levels of spiritual development. Those living on the lowest level look upon God as the Great Void—the Great Unknown. Those living on the second level look upon God as the Enemy, who says: thou shalt not steal; thou shalt not bear false witness; thou shalt not commit adultery; thou shalt not covet. He says NO to many things we want very much to do. Those who have attained the third level of spiritual development look upon God as the Loving Companion.

Does the influence of the Unitarian Church make for the integration (1) of personalities, (2) of communities, (3) of the world; and if not, why not? This is the crucial question that calls for an answer.

"The free mind," about which we hear so much, is important, but it is not an integrating force. The integrating force, in this world and the next, is good will (love). It is love (agape) that creates community. Two forces, acting upon the earth determine its orbit: one, gravitation, is known as the centripetal force; the other, the momentum of the earth, is known as the centrifugal force. The orbit of the earth is the resultant (not a compromise) of these two forces. It is the centripetal force, however, which keeps the earth from flying off into space. Good will (love) acts as a centripetal force in a community; the free mind acts as a centrifugal force. Both are necessary and useful, but it is good will (love) that holds a community together and makes it a living whole. Theoretically setting up "the free mind" to serve as the integrating force in a community, though actually depending upon externals to hold the community together, is like tying a number of horses together by their tails.

Arnold Toynbee, our greatest living historian, says modern man is doomed unless he can learn to control his own nature. He says further: "Effective self-control can be achieved only through the knowledge and love of God."

Other watchmen on the walls of Zion have arrived at the same conclusion. Woodrow Wilson, in his last message to the American people, said: "Our civilization cannot survive materially unless it be redeemed spiritually."

Friedrich Nietzsche, whose superman philosophy, on the whole, is anti-Christian, made three statements which are in full accord with the teachings of Christianity: (1) that "God is dead," by which he meant that the intellectual leaders of Germany had ceased to believe in God; (2) that "the removal of God from the world, deprives the idea of justice of all meaning"; and (3) that without God, nothing remains but "the will of the stronger"—nothing remains but "man's will to power." The outcome of Germany's godlessness needs no comment.

Western Civilization is being weighed in the balance. The pseudo religion of nature-worship and self-exaltation, which threatens to replace Christianity, is the same in essence as what Nietzsche calls "man's will to power." In the final analysis it means putting self-interest above God's Truth and Right.

The committee of scientists, appointed by the U.S. Government, to formulate plans for the international control of atomic energy, declared in their official report that atomic warfare can be averted only if men have good will toward one another. No normal human being questions the truth of this statement, but very few seem to have grasped the meaning of it. Replacing will-to-power by goodwill means the complete transformation of a person's life. William James says: "Man is the most formidable of all beasts of prey, in fact the only one that preys consistently on the members of its own species." This is a fact which must be faced. But a second fact, of even greater importance, is that man can be transformed from an animal existence into a spiritual one, from a beast of prey into a benefactor.

Christianity teaches that the birth in man's heart of the Spirit of God transforms his self-love into love (agape) toward all men. Furthermore, that those "who are led by the Spirit of God are the sons of God." In a profound sense Jesus Christ is the saviour of mankind. In him was the Spirit of God. Those are saved in whose hearts the Spirit of God, which was in Jesus, has been born.

Schweitzer's Debt to Goethe

MAGNUS C. RATTER

A Review of *GOETHE: Two Addresses* by Albert Schweitzer.

Beacon Press \$2. 71p.p.

FROM Schweitzer to Sartre—what a fall is this! Both, to-day, are powerful influences. To help understand them we should look to their fathers in the spirit: Goethe, from whose homespun wisdom Schweitzer weaves a baptismal robe for the next generation; Kierkegaard, from whose gloom Sartre tailors himself a funeral toga. Let those interested in crape tread the solemn way from the morbid Dane to the death haunted Frenchman; we ourselves will take the golden road from the serenity of the poet to the consecration of the thinker.

No representative of goodness is clearly understood unless set against the evil he puts to shame. Paul is worthy seen in himself : set against the Nero of his day he is twice attractive. Once again the fight of good and evil takes cosmic size. To-day, both, as men seen in shadowgraphy, are much enlarged. Neither can escape the over-emphasis of the hour.

So it is that Schweitzer achieves a stature in his lifetime that verges on the fantastic. Men even, much to his anger, describe him as the greatest man in the world. Instantly he raps them sharply on the knuckles for even suggesting it. Yet he cannot escape, try as he will, that men see him as a giant among men. He is of men most human to his intimates; but to the thoughtful he is, increasingly, the man representative of goodness. Only Emerson could adequately set him forth.

That he has become so with neither disciples nor society to commend him, that he has become so merely because two of his books set forth an unusual story, is the greater tribute to the divine power within his life. That he has become so is the reason why men are eager to know about his father—his father in the spirit. Who gave baptism to his early years?

Goethe : Always known to students of Schweitzer but now made easy of access by the English publication of these two essays.

That Schweitzer, in a unique way, was Goethe come to new fresh life was sensed a long time ago. The goodness that was six-tenths theory and four-tenths life in Goethe has become, in Schweitzer, eight-tenths life and two-tenths theory. Even this tribute may offend The Doctor. It cannot be helped. With Churchill he is nearly a myth. But a myth enshrining the noblest possible—service and sacrifice. Hardly even psycho-analysis can find a low motive in his career.

Other than the influence of Jesus the Christ upon his boyish and youthful life Schweitzer is—Schweitzer, because of Goethe. The influence of the master can be traced at so many points in his career. Even as Helen Keller became a world figure because one of the great teachers of the generation unlocked for her the prison doors, so Goethe opened for Schweitzer realms of glory which even he has not yet fully explored.

Without Schweitzer's explicit essays to make this certain it would be obvious to the student of the poet and the fourfold doctor. Doubt of this is not possible. But the debt is so gladly acknowledged in the essays it but remains for English readers to read and have their impressions confirmed.

These essays have been available in German for many years, one of them in English, but buried in a long forgotten number of *The Hibbert*, that journal to which the English student of Schweitzer is much indebted. Under the far-seeing guidance of Dr. Jacks it published more serious articles that gave insight into the mind of Schweitzer in the early years than any other journal. It is difficult to keep track of the Schweitzer articles that blow with the wind nowadays.

Schweitzer's first indebtedness to Goethe coincided with his study of Kant for his doctorate. He was impressed by the fact that Goethe did not try to put the universe into any theory. It is somewhat large to be fitted into a straight-jacket. Despite this, thinkers will try to get it into a neat system, Kantian or otherwise. Not so Goethe; standing aside from the system mongers the poet sang the songs of love and sadness, the thinker thought the thoughts of love and duty, the doer did the deeds of mercy and of kindness, leaving to others, if they must, to create systems as orderly as their morning habits. Schweitzer may return to Goethe in his later years, never would he return to Kant.

Few are gifted by nature to be men on the grand scale. Nature creates mice and elephants; they are not of the same size. Likewise Nature creates numerous Christines and an occasional Goethe. Like da Vinci and a few others, Goethe was intended for Valhalla but, having the wrong labels fixed, he came to this planet. What a man he was: dreamer and man of affairs, prophet and writer, man of faith and scientist, all these and much more.

This fascinated Schweitzer: deep called unto deep. Of a stature, mental and spiritual, so immense it is believable only because it is so human, so humble, so lovable, he has fashioned himself after Goethe. He hitched his wagon to a star, until, with growth, he became a star with his own wide circling orbit.

Though obedience to the Master of Galilee was the first reason, if one would understand why the theologian and the musician renounced these delights to go to Africa, these secondary reasons are to be found in the life of Goethe, who pursued an active practical career while he carried forward his immortal Faust. Odd, but significant, the Third Volume (a phrase known to all Lambarene devotees) has been hung up time and again by the concern of The Doctor for some practical job at the hospital. How deeply Goethe would have understood this.

Those who think writing is Schweitzer's first concern have never understood him. "In the beginning was the deed."

These essays draw out some further parallels twixt Goethe and Schweitzer. What he tells in brevity, who are we to relate the same badly? Read the writing. No one yet, neither Seaver, Hagedorn, nor any of the other eight expositors, have made the difficult in Schweitzer simple. There is nothing difficult. For the simple he wrote simply. For the student he wrote studiously. Two new biographies (one French, one German) are just announced, making four new ones this year. What they will do we do not know, but, thus far, if you want the simplicity of Schweitzer, read Schweitzer. Writers can but redact or reduce. They can simplify nothing.

This quality too comes from Goethe. Having wrestled with the obscurities and the profundities of Kant, taking from him his moral impera-

tive, Schweitzer turned to Goethe, modelling himself on the poet. You may disagree with Schweitzer but one is never in doubt what he is saying. Learned Germans comment that even Schweitzer's prose style is strangely like Goethe's. An analysis of the metaphors would make a fascinating study. The debt to Goethe sometimes is not sufficiently recognised by writers. A full study of this debt may give to some their doctorate.

One of the weird features of the present lunacy that fascinates the mayflies of our culture is that they are styling Schweitzer an Existentialist. As if there were any likeness twixt Sartre and Schweitzer other than that both use pen and ink. The plays of the one are charged with horror, packed with cynicism, larded with sex, filled with every uncleanness that Dante ever imagined. Happily Dante also wrote of Heaven.

Why this mark of the beast should be branded on Schweitzer we cannot think. Only slovenly thinking could possibly bracket the two. That there is meaning in horrid plays we know, as there is meaning in Dante's Hell. But Schweitzer derives from Goethe's Faust and there is more of the Angel's Chorus in him than of either Auerbach's cellar or Gretchen's Garden. Who that has lived with Faust for six months can ever forget the communion? Who that has wandered with Wilhelm Meister can forget that month's walking holiday with the greatest mind of the eighteenth century?

All this, with goodness added, is in Schweitzer. "Reverence for Life" his redemptive gospel, came from Goethe. As, in an instance far greater, poetry from Isaiah was fashioned into a redemption, so again, and in our time, the poet's fancy, re-spoken by a good man, becomes the morning star of our reformation.

We live in an epoch when the empire that gave the world tranquility is come near to suicide. We watch the last red brilliance of a secular culture that was born with Erasmus. The exotic weeds of Sartre create a series of plays that are the wreath which this generation sends to God's funeral. Blood, more blood, cries the cinema addict, the Sartre fan, the dictator.

Yet, as ever, faith knows that as the secular perishes by its own rottenness there drops to the earth the seeds of fresh spring. God is a great economist, His fields are dunged by rotten death. The seed of to-morrow's vine and fig tree show fresh and very lovely amid the red, red rottenness.

With love and reverence toward Jesus Christ, learning from Goethe the open mind of the scientist, taking from Galilee his inspiration, from Weimar his mental life, early in his career Schweitzer consecrated his days to the service of God Eternal. In His service he has found His peace.

Myth: Historic Fact and Eternal Truth

E. G. LEE

THE death of Jesus Christ occurred roughly two thousand years ago. The record of the event as it has come down to us is presented in a pattern or drama that is familiar to every Christian. First, the Agony in the Garden of Gethsemene, then the Passion upon the Cross, then the Resurrection. That drama lies at the heart of the Christian religion.

It is claimed that this pattern of events actually took place in history. On a certain night in the past Jesus was kneeling alone in agony in a garden; on a certain day he was dying upon the cross; on a certain morning his dead body had disappeared and his resurrected spirit came to those who could recognise it.

Stated in this manner, if for a moment we look through the familiar drama, there is a certain universal similarity about the events. Untold numbers of men in history have been alone in mental agony; untold numbers have died a martyr's death or been unjustly put to death by impersonal authority; appearances after death have been countless wherever belief made such appearances possible.

If we look through the sacred familiarity of the drama to what may be described as the historic core, we come to a series of events that have been repeated again and again in history; repeated on a terrible scale in our own day. How many men in our day, presented with a choice of life or death, have been alone with their own agony, often within a garden! How many men, most innocent, have suffered a cruel death! How many people have believed that they have received some personal private intimation of the survival of their loved ones? The historic pattern in some form or other has been repeated in all history.

But this historic repetitive pattern is—as we assuredly know—not intended in the great Christian drama. Something else is intended. The agony, death and resurrection of Jesus are lifted out of time and given an eternal significance. The pattern is separated from all other patterns; there is no other like it; this is unique, absolute and eternal. It is true, in a certain sense, for all men for all time. It is true in the sense of salvation. Do I wish to know the meaning of my life? Do I wish to comprehend the fact of suffering and overcome the tragedy of death? Then I turn to this story, and not only does it claim to explain, but claims to give me strength to overcome and understand. It would be impossible adequately to analyse the union of the believer with this drama. It goes down to the depths of the verities of religious experience. This at least can be said: the drama is religious because it joins historic fact to eternal

truth. In this drama the historic events of suffering and death, that is, events that happen in time, are joined to the abiding everlasting nature of God. It is God who suffers and dies, and in this sense all suffering and death is overcome; for in the everlasting presence of God suffering is defeated and death is rendered a cheat. It is in this sense, and in this sense alone, that the Christian drama is religious.

The creators of the story with trusting simplicity have told us across the ages what they were doing. They were not present at the Agony in the Garden of Gethsemane, and there is no way known to us through which any one could have been told what took place. Even if we take the recorded account literally, Jesus left those who were with him a stone's throw away; and so unconscious were they of what was taking place that they fell asleep, and did not even awake when Jesus came to them, more than once.

The picture engraven on our minds of the lonely kneeling figure with the angel near him is the creation of the religious imagination. They who created it, with never doubting candour tell us it is so.

The same is true of the death on the cross. The recorders of the event do not hesitate to tell us that they understand the event within the insights of their inherited religion, and therefore within the sights of religion. With utmost simplicity they tell us that this inherited religion partly controlled and dictated the form of the Passion. The author of the Gospel according to St. John tells us directly that this is so. He points to his inherited belief as the medium partly controlling what he was describing. He regarded the death as the part fulfilment of the religion of his fathers and himself. The actual event itself, that is the death of a loved man upon the cross, could only be understood when it was lifted out of the nature of an event and joined to the eternal nature of God. The story of the Passion in the Gospel according to St. John is not only history, it is history sublimated by the religious imagination. What is true of the account in the Gospel of St. John is true of the accounts elsewhere in the New Testament.

With unquestioning artless simplicity the men of the New Testament tell us across the ages what they were doing with what they believed to be the fact of the Resurrection. They wrote down what never occurred in order to explain to themselves and others what *had* to occur in the quality of their imagination. Few independent Christians can believe to-day that an apparition of the departed Jesus could eat a meal; fewer still can believe that such an apparition dwelt in consultation with the disciples for forty days before it ascended into heaven. The passage of the ages has revealed not deceit in the recorders of the incidents, but an overwhelming necessity to join the fact of death with the triumph of immortality. In the only manner open to them in their own time they lifted the event of the physical destruction of Christ's body to the eternal

verity of immortal existence. An event was joined to the nature of God, and thus transformed from an event into a religion—and a religion of salvation.

This has become clear to independent minds in Christendom during the past century, and it has created perhaps the most potent revolution of our time. A hundred years ago the overwhelming mass of people in Christendom did not think of the most important historic events in the New Testament as divorced from Eternal Truth. With almost unconscious processes of thought and feeling they joined the Passion of Christ to the nature of God. To-day there is every evidence to show that the overwhelming mass do not do this. They have severed the connection in traditional Christianity between historic events and Eternal Truth. Jesus Christ in any traditional intuitive sense is no longer God, and an entirely just appraisal of the intellectual, and some of the urgent spiritual demands of this age supports them in this. From this point they go on to declare that there is no bridge between what happens in time and what can happen in Eternity. And since the events in time are far more easily apprehended than the truth of Eternity—the events are claimed to be everything, the eternal truths to be illusions. The greatest revolution of our age is surely this: the whole traditional Christian scheme of joining the most compelling and poignant experiences of humanity with the nature of the living God has broken down. It has broken down at least to this extent that it no longer carries conviction to masses of people in Christendom.

This indicates the breakdown of a religion of salvation—and man cannot live without such a religion. He must be saved. That is to say his most awful private experiences, of which suffering and death are only two, must be explained outside the range of his own self-sufficiency. He is no explanation to himself; even the awareness of his own mystery—the mystery of his separate unique existence—baffles him. He must pass beyond himself and his intimate relations with his fellows; he must escape from his imprisonment in history even to begin to find an intellectual and emotional reason for his existence. There must be a Power outside himself and the history in which he lives, to save him. He cannot even adequately live the good life without the awareness of such a Power (although he can try to make heroic attempts to do so), for the good life supposes a moral universe, and a moral universe as the creation of man is an obvious contradiction. Man cannot make a universe greater than he is; and whatever he is he is not the pattern to which the universe should conform. Look around the world and let us hide our heads in shame at the depravity that darkens its surface, and depravity often hidden under the best of intentions. Face the fact that some of the most unselfish deeds in our day have led to the destruction of fellow human beings.

The relationship between historic fact and eternal truth has broken in our day, and because man and his experiences are barren of meaning

simply as events in time, simply as ciphers in a void signifying nothing, he is lost in all the spiritual problems that assail him. Let the truth, the cold truth, be faced. Let us think for a moment merely in terms of a century or a couple of centuries. Life in any tolerable sense is impossible in that time in a world that lives for ever under the curse of modern war : and if we could survive a third world war, and a fourth, what of the fifth? Is it not demonstrably true that on the level of history, that is on the level of doing things day by day with no eternal meaning we are doomed? Is it not essential that men should be confronted with the awful choice of having to choose between good and evil not in terms of what is desirable in their own day, or the days that are to come, but in terms of their eternal welfare? Somehow or other they must lift themselves from the Imprisonment of time to the freedom and light of eternal purpose. Let the bitter truth be faced again although this time from another and perhaps more searching angle. We may—it is possible—survive in the life of the spirit all the evil that men may do to one another, but the cry will inevitably be torn from us, "How long, O Lord, how long, shall brother slay brother, and the weak and innocent be trampled in the dust!" And if that cry means anything it will mean that we are cast down at the feet of the Almighty crying "Mercy" not only for ourselves but for the whole of human kind. There is no escape, most assuredly no escape for those who have seen but a glimmer of the light : the surrender to a religion of salvation is demanded and to no other.

There is no going back to the inherited forms of the past, they lie in pieces, broken at our feet. The nostalgia for spiritual ease may call us back, and we may try to paste the pieces together into a pretence of what they once were; we may even, as some good men are doing, try to fuse the pieces together through the overwhelming passion of our desire; but the forms of old are broken, and we are asked to accomplish not their reconstruction but the re-creation of forms that shall spring with life out of our own paradoxes, and situations that are real for us. There is no going backwards; there is only the urgency of doing what we must do in our own day, and in the doing hear the voice of the past crying out of its own ultimate experiences, "Well done, thou good and faithful servant."

We have to accomplish what men of the past accomplished in situations that were real for them; through the challenges, insights and doubts of our own day we have to join our historic fact to eternal truth. We must turn our event, the event that is happening to us in the middle of the twentieth century, from history to eternity.

I offer, briefly, three reflections upon this :

The first is that we mistake the nature of what we are called upon to do if we mistake its simplicity. The inner life of religion rests as ungrudgingly upon simple faith as upon the speculations of the most massive minded philosophers, or for that matter, upon the challenges of

science. Simple faith has as much, eventually, to justify it, as the most positive and far-reaching learning. A religion of salvation, that is a religion called upon to effect the union between time and eternity will make the first efforts from the affirmation "I believe." In this affirmation, after all, the first dawning of conscious belief in adolescence can be as sure as the reflective experience of age.

Secondly, a religion of salvation being exercised in the modern world will take to itself the stringency and discipline of the scientific spirit. Under no circumstances will it try to twist the world and its consequences to its own purposes. It will recognise, and recognise fully, much of the spiritual cheating that has been going on in the modern world. That cheating may be well illustrated by that embodiment of cheap spiritual effort, the late Adolf Hitler. When the late war began—it has been noted—Hitler was concerned in his speeches with somebody called "I." When he was half-way through it he was concerned with somebody called "Providence." When he was losing the war, and knew that he was a defeated man, he began to call upon somebody called the "Almighty." Hitler was the spiritual magician, the man who tried to twist the universe to his own purposes. He magically turned God into a being that would fulfil his purposes. This is the spiritual rot that tends to eat away the very nature of religion. With more than customary power it must be cleaned away to-day. It exists in many supposedly exalted places.

Thirdly, a religion of salvation will accept the plain open fact of a situation in which millions of men no longer believe in, or can ever again believe in, the ancient forms of belief that supported their fathers. That is our experience. It is the use that can be made of that experience that can disclose to us our own way from historic event to eternal truth. In faith and integrity we must accept what insight has accomplished, and in that acceptance begin to create a new union.

In short, the first step towards a religion of salvation is to accept what our heart tells us is true, that the past in its own particular form of grandeur and truth has gone, and that God demands of us a new way and a new union.

I find nothing daunting in that. I find only a call to the depths of experience, and in that call hear the triumph of the moments and events of time being joined to the verities of eternal life.

The Maieutic Personality

FRANCIS TERRY, M.A.

THE distinction between priest and prophet is well known—so much so, that we are sometimes inclined to assume that *every* sort of religious mission must be classifiable as either priestly or prophetic, according as it is corporate or individual, based upon the experience of generations or upon the insight of the moment. Such an assumption may lead us to disregard or misinterpret the instances (if there be any) in which a religious mission conforms with neither type. In particular, we too easily assume that the features which are common both to the priestly and the prophetic office are essential characteristics of every sort of religious mission, so that, if any man exercises a religious mission from which those features are absent, our attempts to describe his work and character are likely to be defective. It is the thesis of this essay that there have been such men, and that their work would be better understood if we recognised them as together constituting a distinct type of religious personality.

In spite of differences, priest and prophet are united by a common assumption as to the relationship between the "religious expert" and "the non-expert," namely that the expert (whether so constituted by training or by individual vocation) possesses religious knowledge which can be passed on or rendered available for the benefit of the non-expert without actually turning the latter into an expert or abolishing the distinction between them. The priest does not normally aim at making all men priests: he uses his priestly knowledge to give advice or admonitions to laymen or to perform ceremonies for their benefit. The prophet does not normally aim at making all men prophets: having God's word, he declares it to the people, so that they may learn it from him. Thus each is a *mediator* for men who lack direct religious knowledge of their own. It is true that the Old Testament points forward to the ideal of a nation of priests and a time when all the Lord's people shall be prophets; but the realisation of that ideal is not achieved by the exercise of priestly or prophetic functions; it depends upon a third type of mission (the subject of this essay) in which both priest and prophet are transcended.

There is a further feature common to priest and prophet and linking them with many other sorts of human activity. Priest and prophet alike are giving effect to something which already exists (at least in their own minds). This makes it comparatively easy to give an account of their work and assess its success. The priest serves a tradition, or system, of which the characteristic features can be studied and the history narrated. The prophet delivers a message, which can be quoted or summarised, and

which men either accept or reject. This gives their work an objective character which enables it to be described by very much the same methods as the aims and achievements of statesmen and philosophers, reformers and scientists.

There is, however, a type of man whose work baffles our attempts to describe and assess it in this manner. The four outstanding representatives of this type are Socrates, the Buddha, Confucius, and Jesus. Each of these appears as the source of a great, enduring and many-sided influence. Each of them is known to us from literary sources which carry us back almost into the circle of immediate hearers, and, scientifically handled, should afford a sound basis of historical information. And yet each presents us with apparently insoluble problems when we try to ascertain the precise relationship between the aims and work of the historic man and the forms assumed by his posthumous influence. There is a sort of "family-likeness" in the four problems, which suggests that they are not due to accident but to some common characteristic of the four men. They were not concerned with acting as mediators or passing on expert knowledge but with enabling their fellow-men to see spiritual reality for themselves, and thus rendering mediation unnecessary and abolishing the distinction between expert and non-expert. Because their mission is of this type, there is no plain objective message or programme or system by reference to which their work can be described, and its results assessed.

This is clearest and least disputable in the case of Socrates. He does not expound a philosophy but tries to make men more philosophic. He therefore disclaims wisdom and does not purport to teach anything (the so-called "Socratic irony"). His aim is to act as "a mid-wife to men's souls," helping them to bring into the open ideas which are latent in their minds, and testing whether these are "genuine births," (hence the use of "maieutic"—the Greek word for "obstetric"—as a term for the whole class). In this case we see that the difficulties of "the Socratic problem" arise directly from the nature of the Socratic mission. Because Socrates is educating ideas latent in other people, he cannot identify himself with any particular message or system, while his hearers, when they try to describe him, find that their memories are inextricably entangled with the ideas which they have themselves produced under his influence, or even with the reactions by which they have sought to avoid its full implications.

The Buddha appears to us under two aspects. Traditional narratives show him insisting upon a rigid and homogeneous set of doctrines and arguments, which are apparently atheistic, pessimistic and mortificatory in character. On the other hand, he was the originator of a religious movement which has been vigorous, expansive, full of spiritual joy and effort, extremely elastic, diverging into a multiplicity of forms, with a

wealth of heavens and objects of worship. The basic question arises "How can a man who taught such doctrines have initiated such a movement?"

The reason why we find the problem difficult is because we habitually assume that the things about which a man talks most are the ones which lie at the heart of his mission, and hence conclude that, as most of the Buddha's talking was negative and mortificatory, negation and mortification must have been the central characteristics of his work. This is really the old assumption that a religious mission must consist in delivering a "message."

We should realise that the Buddha was not primarily concerned to deliver a message. He had attained "enlightenment," and his aim was to enable other men to do the same. This is an altogether different thing from imparting to them the fruits of his own enlightenment. Time and again it is said that the Enlightened One knows the answer to a question, but that it would be unprofitable for him to declare it: in particular, he consistently refuses to give any information as to the nature of the ultimate goal (Nirvana). On such a subject, nothing can be said which would be helpful to a man who is still dominated by illusion and craving; he would simply take whatever was said, and twist it into new forms of error: the first essential is that he should get free from illusion and craving—and then it will be unnecessary to tell him about Nirvana, as his own enlightenment will enable him to understand it. Thus the Buddha pursues a positive aim by methods which have to be predominantly negative: he analyses error, not enlightenment, suffering not blessedness, the consequences of selfishness, not the reward of unselfishness; he proves that the self (considered as a separate object) is an illusion; he does not explain the nature of ultimate reality. It is on these negative matters that he is argumentative and presses home his views. But his aim is not fulfilled when his interlocutor is convinced by these arguments: an interval usually occurs, in which the man goes off to think things over alone, and then returns and says that he has now attained his own enlightenment: only then is the goal attained. Buddhism is the religion of "Enlightenment," and thus has produced very varied fruits.

Confucius' influence lies at the roots of the central Chinese tradition. The best sources (especially the older portions of the *Analects*) give us the impression of a man of distinctive personal quality but do not enable us to formulate the precise cause and nature of his influence. He was not a codifier or expounder of traditional lore—though he admitted his debt to the past. A number of specific doctrines are "Confucian" in the sense of being held by one or other of the groups of his disciples, but it is doubtful how far any of them was actually distinctive off the master. We seem rather, to be witnessing the fertilising influence of a particular type of personality. We not how Confucius deals entirely

with individuals, taking quite a different line with different disciples, according to their varying characters. He is concerned mainly to stimulate activity in the pupil : when he gives one corner of a matter, the pupil must provide the other three. He refrains from lengthy explanations of his own views, indeed seems to avoid expressing any general views at all : habitually modest, disclaiming wisdom, and a man of few words, he confines his answers to what is strictly relevant. There is something pregnant and forceful in him, which disturbs men and spurs them to moral effort. It is recorded that his favourite pupil said with a deep sigh : "The more I strain my gaze up towards it, the higher it soars; the deeper I bore down into it, the harder it becomes; I catch a glimpse of it in front, but instantly it is behind; step by step the Master skilfully lures one on : even if I wished to stop, I could not; and when, at times, I have exhausted all my powers, something seems to rise up majestically before me; yet, though I long to pursue it, I can find no way of arriving." Confucius was a very Chinese Chinaman, as Socrates was a very Greek Greek : and yet, in the effect that they produced, they are most curiously alike.

The analogy of Socrates, the Buddha and Confucius may help us to understand why the problems of Christian Unity and of the Historic Jesus remain so persistently baffling. These both arise from the same cause, namely that the New Testament is, in certain respects, a very ambiguous group of documents. This ambiguity is of the sort that results characteristically from the activity of a "maieutic personality." The questions, "What was Jesus' message? What rules or doctrines did he formulate? What type of ecclesiastical polity did he authorise? are unanswerable, because Jesus' mission did not consist in laying down the law on such matters. His influence though more positively dynamic than that of the other three, is, in its essential nature, as undefinable as theirs.

According to the accounts in *Acts*, the first great effect of Jesus' mission was the outpouring of the spirit in fulfilment of the prediction in Joel : in a very real sense, everyone who responded to Jesus' influence became a "prophet." The Pauline epistles centre round the distinctive problems arising in a community in which (though all do not actually utter prophecies) all are "spiritual" and have been brought into direct communication with God. Another apostolic expression is that Christianity is "the New Covenant"—the régime predicted by Jeremiah, in which "they shall no more teach every man his neighbour and every man his brother, saying know the Lord," for they shall all know God. So, too, in John's Gospel, Jesus does not offer his followers a well like Jacob's, to which they must constantly return, "but the water that I shall give him shall become in him a well of water springing up unto eternal life."

A mission that produces such results cannot consist in laying down the law, but must encourage and challenge men to exercise their own spiritual faculties, and will often seem to involve refusal to give plain

answers to plain questions. We have noticed these characteristics in the other maieutic men; and so it is with Jesus also. His initial message ("The kingdom of heaven has drawn near") is challenging, but capable of a wide variety of interpretations: he refuses to specify how near the kingdom has come or what is his conception of its nature; instead, he illustrates it by means of parables, which still admit of varying interpretations, and can only be understood by those who have "an ear to hear" (the "Papias tradition" attests that, at the earliest stage, there was no single agreed interpretation of Jesus' sayings). His teaching does not solve problems but rather drags them to light by calling attention to men's inconsistencies, to the difference between the standards which they apply to themselves and to others, and to their failure to conform with what they themselves declare to be authoritative scriptures. He refuses to say what is his own authority or to specify the status which he claims, and discourages the spread of rumours on such topics: even at his trial the dominant impression is that he remained deliberately enigmatical: "It is for *you* to decide what I am and how I should be treated; and I cannot relieve you of that responsibility." Throughout his mission, his opponents are puzzled and keep asking him questions, and even his closest disciples are frequently at a loss what to make of him. In life and death he gives himself to mankind as a challenging problem by which their spiritual education is advanced. This is not to deny that we can obtain good evidence about some of his words and deeds, and even perhaps about his inner character and beliefs: but, if the evidence is to be construed as part of an intelligible picture, the "maieutic" features must be kept at the centre. "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the voice thereof, but knowest not whence it cometh, and whither it goeth: so is every one that is born of the Spirit."

The Editor asked Mr. Terry to develop the foregoing article by applying his thesis to the practical work of the Ministry. Mr. Terry replied that this was out of the question as the laying down of laws or canons would be a complete negation of the maieutic idea. His parable of a modern maieutic ministry is, however, too good an addendum to remain unpublished. Here it is—

The Rev. Habakkuk Maieutic preached a remarkable series of Lenten sermons, as a result of which:—Charles quadrupled his subscription to Mr. Maieutic's church, and offered to teach in the Sunday School; Henry left that church and joined the Rationalist Press Association; Richard was converted to Roman Catholicism; Arthur joined the army; Rupert joined the Peace Pledge Union; Thomas was reconciled to his wife; Roger instituted divorce proceedings; James abandoned his poetical ambitions and became reconciled to his office job; George threw up a prosperous business career in order to become a painter; each of them persisted in the course which he thus started and looked back on it as the beginning of his finding the right path through life. Mr. Maieutic himself, when preparing his sermons, had no idea of any of these possible results.

The Mind of the East

HERBERT CRABTREE

A Review of *HINDU PSYCHOLOGY : ITS MEANING
FOR THE WEST* by Swami Akhilananda.

G. Routledge; 12/6, Pp. 228

THE advances made by Western psychology during the first half of this century have been spectacular and important, but they have not altogether fulfilled the expectations which in their earlier stages they aroused. It was with some reason supposed that the new technique of psycho-analysis would lay bare the deepest springs of action and lead to a clear understanding of all mental motives and impulses. In truth, it now appears that the more we know of the mind the more profound and complex it is seen to be, and the glib "behaviourist" viewpoint, so fashionable not long ago, now strikes us as being not so much specious as naïve. Meanwhile, there is an Eastern psychology to which the West has given but little serious attention. Its technique is different and the objectives it pursues seem sometimes strange and odd. But with the resurgence of the East and our growing lack of self-confidence in the West, it is high time that we made ourselves more closely acquainted with this Eastern psychology. To that end this book is a valuable aid. The writer's knowledge of the principal European and American schools of thought is adequate. He does not under-rate their importance, but he considers them insufficient and seriously incomplete. He is not impressed by our hedonistic and practical approach :

"Hindu psychology has quite a different emphasis, as it flourished in a nation where the subjective elements of mind and unique inner mental states play a great part. . . . The greatest expression of mind lies in its total illumination, which is achieved by the subjective methods of concentration and meditation and consequent mental integration. . . . Greatness of mind can be judged not by its ability in action but rather by its integration and unification."

For readers primarily interested in religion, the author has much of significance to say, especially concerning what he terms the "super-conscious state." This would appear to be not intrinsically different from the mystical states of the Christian tradition, though the methods of attaining thereto are different and will repay study. Nor does the author lose himself in sheer subjectivism.

"Let us not forget that the aim and goal of religion is to know and experience God or the Ultimate Reality. If anyone or any group ignores the first commandment of Jesus he is bound to miss the primary objective of religion . . . True social service, philanthropic work, and

love of one's neighbour are practised and taught by the people who are well established in these higher experiences and love of God."

The book concludes with a wise and thoughtful chapter headed "Philosophy of Life." He rightly says that certain popular schools of psychiatric treatment are inevitably bound to fail inasmuch as they are indifferent to the spiritual needs of their patients. It is only too true that false religious beliefs may themselves be responsible for psychological disorder, and liberal thinkers are well aware of this, but perhaps even the worst aberrations of religious pathology are less harmful to the psyche as a whole than the modern emphasis upon sensuous and hedonistic satisfactions. "Frustration is inevitable so long as pleasure remains the primary objective of life." There is much truth in the witticism that life would be tolerable were it not for its pleasures!

There are many things in this book upon which the Western mind may prefer to suspend judgment, but no one whose thought is free from the complacencies and superficialities of a materialistic psychology can fail to find in it much that will enrich and deepen the sense of reverence which wise men feel for the human mind and its true objective, the Mind of God.

The book ends with a quotation from Swami Vivekananda with which every liberal thinker will warmly concur :

"Each soul is potentially divine. The goal is to manifest this Divinity within by controlling nature, external and internal. Do this either by work, or worship, or psychic control, or philosophy, by one or more or all of these—and be free. This is the whole of religion. Doctrines, or dogmas, or rituals, or books, or temples, or forms are but secondary details."

Religion and Reality Thinking

WILLIAM J. CARTER, M.A.

TWO converging approaches to the age-old problem of the nature of valid thinking have, in recent years, been influential. The study of the nature and history of language has drawn attention to the importance of its function of conveying emotive responses to situations, and revealed that what we had supposed to be its chief work, namely to make possible correct description of situations, has been a late development realised only within very narrow limits. At the same time, modern psychology has made possible some analysis of the unconscious and irrational motives which enter into men's apprehension of reality and still more into their utterances about it.

These lines of thought have led their exponents to isolate and exalt those kinds of thinking which are independent of variable emotions and attitudes, to which the name "Reality-thinking" is often given, and to discredit other kinds. They have pointed to the ambiguity of religious, ethical and aesthetic concepts, such as "Good," "God," "Beauty," and declared that propositions employing these terms tell us nothing about the objective world, but only about the minds of those who use them. It is worth while, therefore, to examine these ideas, and in particular to ask whether the elimination of religious thinking would really give us a clearer view of reality.

Mr. Rupert Crawshaw-Williams, in his book *Comforts of Unreason*, defines reality-thinking as follows—"Reality-thinking is the name I am giving to a technique of thinking specially adapted to the specific purpose of enabling us to deal successfully with the objective world and its phenomena, by forming correct opinions about these phenomena and about their causes and effects." He goes on to tell us that the technique involved in reality-thinking is that of science. The objective world includes human emotions and opinions "when once they have manifested themselves as behaviour observable by outsiders." The knowledge afforded by reality-thinking is only a part of what is, or can be, called "Knowledge." "It has, for instance, relatively little to do with the arts and nothing whatever to do with what are known as 'the higher things of life' or the 'ultimate realities.'"

It is knowledge merely of what is going on outside our own brains, and the reality with which it deals is the reality only of the objective world." And again, "Knowledge of such things as the 'ultimate realities' is of no value whatever as a contribution to reality-thinking."

Such language as the above is quite innocuous in so far as its purpose is to draw a distinction between science and other kinds of knowledge and to point out the advantages of the former. We all recognise that within the area in which scientific knowledge has been successfully applied man's investigation of objective reality has yielded an approximation to certainty not otherwise obtainable. To say so amounts to little more than saying that science alone is scientific. But to equate reality-thinking (which according to this writer virtually excludes art and entirely excludes "the higher things of life" and "ultimate reality") with our total knowledge of the objective world is surely to leave us very ignorant indeed. I cannot think, for instance, that we ought to reject the claim of history to be an investigation of objective reality. Yet history is as much an art as a science. It can, and should, make use of scientific method in gathering its data, but it could not exist without judgments which admit of no verification, since they concern events which have occurred and can never exactly recur. When Dr. Toynbee formulates conclusions about the fall of successive civilisations, he is certainly attempting to apply a method of generalisation familiar to science, but he is working in a region in which factors are less amenable to isolation than they are in its accustomed fields. May not the same be said of psychology? Within limits the investigator can apply the scientific method of generalised observation and experiment, but there comes a point at which something unique in the personality investigated or in his circumstances forces him into the region of speculation.

However widely scientific method is interpreted, we are constantly forced to make judgments upon matters to which it is not applicable. These judgments are concerned with objective reality, or some aspect of it, and some among them do in fact help us to understand and deal with situations arising in the objective world. At least it cannot be denied that among the things we are most anxious to know are some which science cannot tell us, and that this curiosity is too deep and abiding not to seek satisfaction, however limited the means of satisfying it may be. In the introduction to his *History of Western Philosophy* Lord Russell gives a list of these from which we may select a few. "Has the universe any unity or purpose? . . . Is man what he seems to the astronomer, a tiny lump of impure carbon and water, impotently crawling on a small and unimportant planet? Or is he what he appears to Hamlet? Is he perhaps both at once? Is there a way of living that is noble and another that is base, or are all ways of living merely futile? If there is a way of living that is noble, in what does it consist, and how shall we achieve it? Must the good be eternal in order to deserve to be valued or is it worth seeking even if the universe is inexorably moving towards death?"

These are questions which science cannot answer, but they are questions about objective reality and not about what goes on in the brain

of the questioner. No doubt it would be a good thing if we could have final and verifiable answers, but we cannot, and yet we need answers of some kind because we should not know what to do with our lives without them. Where can we turn for provisional answers, or at least for clues? Men do in fact turn to philosophy, art and religion.

The achievement of philosophy appears if we consider the cases of the Platonic Socrates and of Spinoza. Each of these tried to devise a technique of thinking capable of producing certain knowledge. Neither succeeded in creating a technique which could be accepted as it stood by subsequent philosophers, nor did either bequeath to posterity a body of firmly established truth. Yet each left behind an example of intellectual honesty capable of inspiring even those who are most critical of their doctrines, and each showed by his life that philosophy can enable a man to deal successfully with the phenomena of the objective world.

Turning to art, let us consider the case of poetry, which has the advantage that it combines the characteristics of art with a method involving statements comparable with those of science. The relation of poetry to reality-thinking has been interestingly discussed by Dr. I. A. Richards in his essay called *Science and Poetry*. Dr. Richards notices that poetry consists largely of propositions not distinguishable in form from scientific statements, but differing in purpose, since they are, as he says, evocative and not referential. Accordingly he calls them "pseudo-statements," though that does not mean that they are necessarily false. Their truth or falsity is not the important thing about them, since their acceptance is entirely governed by their effect upon our feelings and attitudes. "A pseudo-statement is 'true,'" he says, "if it suits and serves some attitude or links together attitudes which on other grounds are desirable." The advent of science has created a conflict between the view of the world it offers and that which satisfies our emotional needs and is therefore appropriate to poetry. "The remedy," says Dr. Richards, "is to cut our pseudo-statements free from the kind of belief which is appropriate to verified statements. So released they will be changed, of course, but they can still be the main instruments by which we order our attitudes to one another and to the world." Now the appeal of poetry cannot be expressed in a single formula. A poem may give intense pleasure simply by saying something supremely well, even if what it says is trivial or false. But to be deeply satisfying poetry must surely be consistent with a view of reality in which one can believe. Poetic tragedy transforms evil not by denying it but by looking hard at it, and through it showing us the dignity of humanity as we could not have seen it without the evil. So in a time of doubt and heart-searching, poetry ought to exhibit that doubt as a noble part of man's burden. Is not that just what Hardy's poetry does?

To claim for religion any validity as a way of gaining knowledge or control of the objective world is rendered supremely difficult by the variety of its manifestations. Every religionist rejects more religions than he accepts and denies more gods than he acknowledges. All that can be offered is one among many possible views.

Externally regarded, religion is an aspect of human thought, feeling and behaviour. Every religious movement and institution has an origin and a history comparable with those of secular movements and institutions. And every religion has, at any given time, a set of precepts dealing with the ordering of life and the kind of person or society it seeks to create. In all these respects it is an order of phenomena among other orders. As such it is subject to the same laws, and must be judged by the same standards, as other similar orders of phenomena. It is a part of the objective world, and can be studied like any other part. It enters into reality-thinking as part of the objective world and can claim no exemption. Its own utterances about the objective world must justify themselves to reality-thinking, and cannot claim to belong to a different order because of a supernatural origin. The refusal of religious institutions and leaders to accept humbly the consequences of their humanity has done much to discredit religion, and the strongest religious institutions to-day are showing no sign of accepting the only kind of status they can hope for in an age so deeply and, as I think, healthily impregnated with scientific concepts as our own. On the contrary, they are asserting with new vigour their claim to belong to an order outside the phenomenal world and not to be judged by its standards. The most regrettable thing is that their attitude is widely regarded as inseparable from religion.

From another point of view, however, religion always involves a reaching up from the world of routine experience to a higher order of being which does not belong to the phenomenal world, and is neither subject to its laws nor apprehendable by its methods. Like philosophy, religion seeks beyond the parts for the whole, or the spirit of the whole, but it differs from philosophy in conceiving that which it seeks as essentially self-revealing. The method by which religion reaches upward to meet the self-revelation of its God may be called mysticism, but this must be taken to mean something common to all first-hand religious experience, and not simply the prerogative of the elect. Mystical insights require interpretation, and that will, of course, be affected by methods of thought practised in dealing with the phenomenal world. But reality-thinking takes account of religious experience only as a psychological or sociological phenomenon; of its validity it can know nothing.

Scientific Method and Authority

E. H. MORRIS, M.A., B.D.

THE question of authority raises a fundamental issue for religion, as indeed it does for any system of thought. Without some measure of authority our beliefs would remain trivial and ineffective. This is as true of our scientific beliefs as it is of our religious convictions.

What then is the nature of the authority which we can claim for the articles of our faith? Or rather, what test of veracity and validity must our belief meet before they can be regarded as reasonably established?

There are those who claim an absolute authority for their beliefs. For them truth is hypostatized as a fixed and unchanging entity, knowledge of which can be achieved as necessary and final. Such would be the view of the thoroughgoing authoritarian in religion, and also the thoroughgoing rationalist. For the former, knowledge of the truth, so conceived, is a matter of revelation mediated supernaturally. Such knowledge is infallible and unalterable. It may be added to but is otherwise incapable of modification, and is certainly incapable of being shown to have been false. Here is authority *par excellence*, if one is able to accept the premisses upon which it is founded. But unfortunately it fails to account for vast tracks of our experience—the realm of error.

For the thoroughgoing rationalist the foundations of knowledge are given in the constitution of the mind. There are certain forms or categories of thought which are inherent in the mind. From these necessary and unerring axioms it is possible to deduce *a priori* the entire structure of reality. There is nothing of contingency here. What follows from first principles follows necessarily, and the first principles are indubitable. Once again we are in the realm of complete authority provided we are prepared to grant the premisses. But the notorious incapacity of rationalists to agree among themselves as to what these first principles are, and what can be deduced from them, does not serve to create confidence in their initial pre-suppositions. Furthermore, the realm of contingency in our experience is far too stubborn a factor to be dismissed in this debonair fashion. While we may be prepared to grant the truth of universals (in some sense), or uniformities in experience, we are equally incapable of closing our eyes to the facts of change and the emergence of novelty. The alternative would be to accept a view of the world as a closed system, rigidly deterministic. Nor can we escape from this palpably false alternative by distinguishing between truths of reason and truths of fact, as though the realms of the universal and the contingent constituted a duality.

Relinquishing then the claim to absolute authority, can we establish grounds for, at all events, a partial authority for our beliefs, and are there means by which this authority can be increased?

The empiricist would tell us that our authority must be sought in the facts themselves. Facts, however, are meaningless in the absence of interpretation, and it is our interpretations that are in need of authentication. This much, however, must be conceded to the empiricists, that facts are objective in character, and do not depend for their existence upon our interpretations. Facts, to be meaningful, must be interpreted, but our interpretations must fit the facts, and not the facts our interpretations. The incidence of facts will have specific repercussions upon the world whether we are aware of their significance and meaning or not.

The measure of authority which attaches to our beliefs therefore will be related to two things: (1) our exploration of the facts, and (2) our systems of interpretation.

It was the recognition of this two-fold nature of inquiry which led Francis Bacon to lay down the foundations of scientific method. Both the rationalists as well as the empiricists, he claimed, had gone astray. The latter because they had adopted the technique of the ant, amassing great heaps of facts without any unifying principles, and the former in adopting the method of the spider, weaving its web out of its own substance. The true method, he suggested, was that of the bee, collecting its material from the world without, and working it up.

Science, by and large (*pace* Eddington and his *a priori* deductions) has remained true to the method that Bacon laid down. And in following this method Science has achieved amazing results.

Scientific truth speaks with authority. Not absolute authority, but nonetheless sufficient authority. An Einstein may still gainsay a Newton, but insofar as the latter has applied his method validly to his limited field, the new knowledge will transcend the old without liquidating it or totally invalidating it.

The authority of science then can be seen to rest upon the adequacy of its method and the results achieved by employing it. Its truth is descriptive of reality, and the test of its truth is the successful handling of that reality. But the method it employs is not something given *a priori*, but is rather something which, as Dewey has pointed out, has arisen out of inquiry and is being constantly refined in the course of inquiry. Even logical forms are in some sense descriptive of reality. They must ultimately be shown to conform and to correspond to the nature of things.

Sometimes, however, the term science is restricted to those inquiries which confine their attention to the metrical aspect of things to the exclusion of qualitative considerations. This would be to exclude from science all concerns of value, and vast tracks of human experience and behaviour would be precluded from scientific investigation and inquiry.

This is surely an unjustifiable limitation of the term. It is true that at certain levels of 'behaviour' quantitative considerations appear to be sufficient for the purposes of prediction, but even at this level it is dubitable whether the isolates can be completely insulated from the intrusion of qualitative factors. With growing complexity in behaviour patterns, the role of qualitative factors increases, and concurrently the degree of precise prediction diminishes. The higher the level of integrated patterns the greater the degree of the incidence of novelty and the consequent diminution of the precision of prediction.

This however is true only when the sciences are viewed in isolation. When experience is viewed as a totality, there is a sense in which the more highly developed qualitative patterns control the behaviour of the lower. Man's behaviour can interfere with, and control the behaviour of a stone more effectively than the stone's can interfere with his. By effective controls it has been possible to increase the rate of mutation and to split the atom, thereby introducing qualitative changes in the patterns of behaviour at lower levels. If then spontaneous behaviour at the lower levels is more stable and uniform, behaviour at the higher levels is more effective in establishing controls, thereby achieving stability on higher planes. The denotation of the term science must be extended to include the investigation of behaviour at these higher levels. The researches of Psychology and History can clearly be scientific, nor need their authority be negligible provided they apply the same basic standards as elsewhere throughout the realm of scientific inquiry. Indeed to claim the title to science, inquiry, in whatever department, must be able to demonstrate that it follows its essential methods.

If Theology is to speak with authority it too must be scientific—It must be prepared to follow the method of science, though it will apply it to a wider range of facts.

What then, precisely, constitutes scientific method? This question is wrapped up with the whole problem of epistemology. What is involved in knowing? We have already suggested that the weakness of both the rationalists as well as the empiricists lay in their failure to recognise the two-fold factor of Induction and Deduction as involved in all inquiry, with the primary emphasis upon facts. But this has not yet penetrated to the nerve of our problem. What does a 'fact' involve?

The major difficulty with which we are confronted here is that our knowledge of things is mediated through the mechanism of experience. Our knowledge of the external world is through sense experience, and some would suggest that our knowledge therefore is of *sensa* and not of the external world at all. Certain schools of idealism have gone so far as to assert that these *sensa* are the sole existents. Indeed it can be cogently argued with Hume that idealist epistemology is logically committed to this position. And if our *sensa* constitute all that we can know

then it is difficult to escape the final conclusion of solipsism as Wittgenstein has shown. Furthermore, if our senses can, as they often do, lead us astray, then there is an end to all authoritative knowledge, and solipsism is further reduced to a thoroughgoing scepticism. Whilst, in the nature of the case, absolute proof in these matters is denied us, and there can be no absolute authority to guide us, the whole range of our experience and the relative success with which we manifestly can, and do, manipulate our world leaves us with the firm conviction that there is something radically amiss with this interpretation of knowledge.

Fuller justice is done to the whole range of our experience by adopting the more realistic view that *sensa* have a two-fold relation (1) via the network of nerves and sense organs (as well as an external physical medium in the case of sight) to the physical object or external thing, and (2) to an integrated system of thought including mental attitudes, beliefs and also scientific hypotheses.

In this way the *sensum* has a two-fold reference, subjective and objective. This is most clearly seen in the case of illusions and hallucinations, when the interpretation of the object before the mind (the *sensum*) conflicts with the reality in the external world.

The integrated patterns of thought however are not given. They are not innate, as the rationalists thought, but are built up as the result of experience of the external world, and are tested by practice in that world. The final appeal must be to the facts, and facts are not fiction but must normally be regarded as reports of the behaviour of things in the real world which includes ourselves and also transcends our own particularity.

But how shall we be certain that our *sensa* truly report the facts? What check have we on illusion and error?

In the first place we have the check of public knowledge which, generally speaking, can claim superior authority over private knowledge or opinion. But not always. It is possible, though rare, for the individual to be right, against the whole body of public opinion.

In the last analysis the ultimate test is the successful manipulation and handling of the world of things. "By their fruit ye shall know them." For general purposes the test of coherence with the integrated system of mental attitudes co-operatively achieved, is sufficient to establish the authority we require for our beliefs.

But progress involves the creation of new sets of mental attitudes or beliefs as the result of a prolonged process of testing the correspondence of the new truth with the actual course of events in the external world.

But how do these new truths arise? By intuition? But what is intuition? Is it some new mode of knowing which need not conform

with the requirements of scientific method? If so, by what test shall its authority be established? The intuitions of Hitler have taught us that their authority is not *sui generis*.

In our analysis an intuition is to be regarded as a sort of 'hunch', an hypothesis that occurs to one in the absence of complete or sufficient evidence. It arises as a working plan of action, directing further inquiry.

People possess this capacity in varying degrees. How is this to be explained? It is wrong, I contend, to suggest, as Bergson did, that intuition is a faculty over against reason. The pretensions of faculty psychology have been the bane of philosophy. Intuition, Reason, Instinct and what you will are but modes of the total reaction of personality.

What then accounts for this difference in intuitive capacity between one individual and another? It is here explained in the light of two considerations: (1) differences in congenital outfit, particularly in relation to *g*, the capacity to grasp relevances, and (2) differences in the degree of the systematization of knowledge, or the integration of complex systems of mental attitudes, so that the excitation of one induces the excitation of another relevant to it.

In this way Intuition can be regarded as a sort of conceptual reflex, which operates (as the reflex arc) quicker than conscious thought. The self evidence it promotes is due to a deep sense of coherence with the whole conceptual system, or a strong sense that the new insight supplies a felt defect in that system. Nonetheless the intuition, in order to be established and to acquire authority, must be seen, in the light of conscious reflection, really to be coherent, or to correspond in a new way to the demands of the external situation. Similiar considerations would apply to the phenomena of inspiration and genius.

It is the contention of this paper that there is no way of knowing, intuitional, mystical or any other, which can claim exemption from these tests, for without them there can be no authority behind our beliefs, and belief without authority is indistinguishable from idle fancy or wishful thinking.

What of Faith? Faith, in our view, is the projection of our present insights upon the future. It bids us believe that our ideals, as potentialities in the womb of the present, operative as spurs to action not yet realised, will be actualised in the future. No doubt new forms will arise, but we believe that while they may transcend the present they will not wholly liquidate or totally invalidate our present insights. We can believe this because our ideals, though unrealised, are not unrelated to reasonable expectation arising out of our experience of the known. As Day Lewis has it:

Somewhere beyond the railheads
Of Reason, south or north,
Lies a Magnetic Mountain
Riveting sky to earth.

But it is only at "the railheads of Reason" that the vision is vouchsafed or its authority assured. We must be prepared to give reasons for the hope that is in us. Arguments for a blissful immortality based upon the absence of bliss or of justice in the known world, as Bertrand Russell has pointed out, fly in the face of the laws of inference and have little to commend their authority. He, who has not discerned God in the world he knows, has slender ground for expecting to discover him in the unknown future. There is the truth behind the conception of incarnation. On the other hand, just as it is reasonable to believe that the sun will rise to-morrow on the basis of our organised experience of the past (and we take out our insurance policies accordingly), so it is reasonable to infer with Whitehead that since evil is unstable in our world, therefore our world is a moral order, and that that moral character of the world will persist into the future. If we found the reign of God to be operative in history, our faith that it would continue in the future is not lacking in rational foundation, and carries with it a sufficient and lasting authority. If we would increase the authority of our belief and our faith in the power of goodness, we can do so only by putting our belief to the test in the practice of goodness.

The Pattern of Unitarian Worship

H. LISMER SHORT, M.A.

SO far our historians have paid little attention to the origin and development of our characteristic forms of worship. The subject has been left to the psychologists and aesthetes, who tend to accept existing practices as inevitable, or to fly to orthodox models for improvements. All that is offered here is a few notes on a series of key-documents.

1. *The First Prayer Book of King Edward VI*, 1549. Cranmer produced for the new Protestant State-church a drastic but seemly simplification of the mediaeval service books. From the breviary, the monastic choir-offices, he compiled two short daily services of Matins and Evensong. They were shorter than the corresponding services of the present Book of Common Prayer, and intended as the daily devotional drill of the clergy and the colleges. The Communion service, "commonly called the Mass," is more elaborate and ceremonial than in the present Prayer Book, and was meant to be the chief congregational service on Sundays, following Matins and Litany.

This book completely failed to satisfy the most vocal opinion in the Church of England, which was Calvinist and wanted Calvin's form of service, or "the practice of the best Reformed churches."

2. *Calvin's Service Book* (the version which had most influence on the English reformers may be consulted in W. D. Maxwell, *John Knox's Genevan Service Book*.) This was based not on the breviary but on the Mass. The order is roughly : prayer of penitence, scripture, short prayer for a blessing on the sermon, sermon, long prayer of thanksgiving and petition, leading up to the Communion; with metrical psalms sung at beginning and end, and often also before the sermon. When the Communion was omitted, the rest of the service was undisturbed, and ended with the long prayer. As Calvinists believed that worship should come from the heart and not be merely a prescribed drill, printed service books went out of favour; the minister was expected to follow this pattern of worship but in his own words. For the same reason, ceremonial was diminished to bareness. The Communion was modelled on the Gospel account of the Last Supper, and the communicants sat round or near a table.

3. *The Second Prayer Book of King Edward VI.*, 1552. To meet the outcry, Cranmer tried again. But he merely revised his first book to meet particular objections. The result was a curious hybrid of mediaeval and Calvinist. A Calvinist penitential introduction (sentences, call to penitence, confession, absolution) was prefixed to Morning Prayer. A penitential introduction (the ten Commandments) was prefixed to the Communion, which was shorn of ceremonial and turned into "the Lord's Supper," celebrated round a table.

The reforming party, or Puritans, still fought for further change, but the conservative forces in church and state tried to compel them to accept this settlement as final. The Church of England, however, was still regarded as one of the "Reformed," (i.e., Calvinist) churches, and was represented at the Synod of Dort, 1618. A bitter conflict arose when leadership in the Church of England passed from the Calvinists to a new Sacramental and Arminian party, led by Andrewes and Laud. Ceremonial was increased, and the table was restored to the east end of the chancel and again called an altar.

4. *A Directory for the Publique Worship of God in the Three Kingdoms*, 1644. After the Puritans had won the Civil War, Parliament appointed the Westminster Assembly of Divines to make a new settlement of religion. The new prayer-book was Calvinist in form, but showed the influence of the Book of Common Prayer. Spontaneity and order were reconciled by giving the prayers in outline only, which the minister was to clothe in his own words. The order is : prayer of humble reverence, Old Testament and New Testament readings, long prayer before sermon (confession of sin, petitions for the Reformed churches, those in authority, etc.), sermon, long prayer of thanksgiving. The Scottish commissioners pro-

tested against the long prayer before the sermon, but were over-ruled. It was suggested that in his final prayer the minister should "turn the chief and most useful heads of the sermon into some few petitions, and to pray that it may abide in the heart and bring forth fruit"; some American Unitarian ministers still follow this practice. The Lord's Supper is to follow the morning service, and the table is to be "decently covered and so conveniently placed that the communicants may orderly sit about it." This book settled the pattern of worship used in our earliest chapels.

5. *The Savoy Liturgy*, 1661. At the Restoration the Presbyterians, as the Puritan clergy were now called, still hoped for a comprehensive church on Puritan principles. But the differences were deep and bitter. The restored bishops insisted on obedience to the Book of Common Prayer, which the Presbyterians would accept only if it was amended or made optional. Richard Baxter produced a suggested alternative liturgy of his own. It is probably not typical, for he was an individualist. It is of the Calvinist type, modified. The central part of the morning prayer shows some reminiscences of the Book of Common Prayer, treated in a Calvinist manner; his Communion service is based on primitive liturgies. The rest of the book is completely Puritan. Except for the Communion service, Baxter's book is formless and wordy; the Calvinist liturgical tradition was breaking down.

The Dissenters were ejected from the national church in 1662. The Toleration Act of 1689 allowed them to build Meeting Houses, which were designed for Calvinist worship, i.e., with a table in the middle. After about 1730 this plan was gradually modified into the auditorium shape, with the pulpit at the end of the building instead of the side. In the 18th century the Presbyterians took up again the idea of a service-book. There were three types, adopted for different reasons.

6. *Forms of Prayer and other Offices for the Use of Unitarian Societies*, 1783. Joseph Priestley was distressed by the decline of the congregations of Liberal Dissent, and tried to provide a seemly form of prayer which could be used by laymen where a congregation could not support a minister. It was in effect a typical service of the period written out in full. It shows that the Calvinist order was still in use: hymn, introductory prayer, two readings, hymn, a long prayer, sermon, hymn, long concluding prayer which contains, in true Calvinist style, thanksgivings and petitions for all men. It is Calvin's service, as modified by the Directory. A few pastoral prayers are provided, but Priestley laments that the old "discipline" was gone. The prayers are prosy, and the emphasis is intellectual and moralising rather than devotional.

7. *A Form of Prayer . . . for the Use of a Congregation of Protestant Dissenters in Liverpool*, 1761. Many dissenters believed that if they could issue a prayer-book as dignified and picturesque as the Book of Common Prayer, but more up-to-date, they would draw large numbers away from

the Church of England. This book is one of a series produced with this aim, and its style has affected our services. It is based on the philosophy of John Locke, sensible, rational and benevolent, and its language is decorative but tame. The congregation is given plenty to say, in long and frequent responses; this is the origin of modern Acts of Thanksgiving and the like. The biggest defect is the compilers' lack of any sense of liturgical movement. The Directory is responsible for the fact that the confession of sin now appears in the middle of the service instead of at the beginning.

The simpler versions of this service show that its basic framework was Calvinist, of the Directory type. For example, J. T. Rutt, in *Liturgies for Unitarian Worship*, 1801, provided ten alternative services, on this simple plan: exhortation with response, introductory prayer, first reading, responsive act of praise, first hymn, responsive act of thanksgiving, second reading, long prayer of confession, second hymn, short prayer and sermon, third hymn, long concluding prayer for all conditions of men, ending with the Lord's Prayer. It is this long final prayer which is typically Calvinist.

8. *Theophilus Lindsey's Prayer Book*, 1774. There was a movement in the Church of England to reform the Book of Common Prayer on rational and liberal principles. When an attempt to relieve the clergy of subscription to the Articles and Prayer Book failed, Lindsey left the Church and founded Essex Street Unitarian Chapel. He adopted a version of the Book of Common Prayer, with verbal alterations to make it theologically acceptable. So a new strain entered Unitarian worship. But the Prayer Book was used in the 18th century manner, and not as intended by Cranmer. Cranmer's daily service had now become, in Lindsey's book, "The order for Morning Prayer *every Lord's Day* throughout the year." The archaic style of the Prayer Book is retained, even where it no longer represents the facts; e.g. the service ends with "a valedictory form of blessing," although a sermon was to follow, and there is no mention of hymns or sermon though, of course, these were used.

The Prayer Book pattern of service also entered Nonconformity through Methodism, which too was an offshoot of 18th century Anglicanism. Imitation of the Church of England became rife. Meeting Houses were no longer built; their place was taken by Gothic churches, whose chancels and altars had no functional significance, but were merely a romantic stage-setting.

9. *Common Prayer for Christian Worship*, 1862. This Unitarian service book was widely adopted, and is typical of its period. Although it provides ten orders of worship and many eloquent prayers (showing descent from the Liverpool book of 1761), its framework is Anglican, even to peculiarities due merely to historical accident. Three chants in the Book of Common Prayer (psalms, Te Deum and Benedictus) are copied by three prescribed chants in the same positions in this book. As in the

Anglican book, the prayers are broken in the middle by the anthem, and the rubric even copies the antiquated spelling of the 16th century. (The anthem in the Book of Common Prayer had originally ended the service, until the "state prayers" were added after it in 1662.) The Communion service, however, owes nothing to the Book of Common Prayer except the concluding Gloria, and is merely of the brief Dissenting pattern. The book is dignified and solemn, though unnecessarily archaic, and the prayers by Dr. Martineau in the Ninth and Tenth Services have a deep emotional cadence.

But Dr. Martineau turned sharply away from the rationalism of Priestley and Belsham, and started a fashion among some Unitarians of trying to destroy our own traditions of worship in favour of a revived mediaevalism.

10. *Common Prayer* (Belfast), c. 1900. This characteristic liturgy was provided by E. I. Fripp for the Second Presbyterian Congregation (All Souls' Church), Belfast, founded in 1708. It is a close copy of the Morning and Evening Prayer, Litany and Psalter of the Book of Common Prayer, but (strangely) no Communion service; in other words, it is an ornamental imitation of Anglicanism, without its sacramental heart. When he went from Belfast to Mansfield he insisted on the adoption of this liturgy and the addition of a chancel to an ancient Meeting House, necessitating a complete remodelling of its interior. Other congregations issued a Psalter divided into portions for each morning and evening of the month, though they had no intention of holding daily services. The Free Catholic Movement, with all its virtues, was aesthetic and romantic, not historical, in its ideas of worship. Its members appealed to the example of Richard Baxter, whom they claimed as a theological liberal who gladly accepted the ancient liturgy (it was a misinterpretation). At that date there had been no real enquiry into the liturgical origins of Nonconformist worship, and the only hope of improvement seemed to be by copying current orthodoxy. J. M. Connell, in the preface to *Common Prayer in Nine Services*, 1925, could mistakenly state that his use of hymns in place of the Biblical psalms was an innovation; he had forgotten the Calvinist metrical psalms, several of which had by custom their prescribed use.* Many such books were published; some closely copied the Book of Common Prayer in both form and phrasology, some copied it in form but drew on wider sources for collects and litanies, and some showed the influence of the prayer-books of 1862 and 1761.

11. *A Book of Prayer in Thirty Orders of Worship*, 1907. This book, compiled by R. C. Jones, is unusual in that it provides a large number of introductory portions of services and other prayers, yet leaves the

* Lutheranism used its chorales in an even more liturgical manner. A special hymn was assigned to each Sunday, and other hymns had their prescribed places in the Lutheran Mass. Luther even versified the Lord's Prayer.

rest of the service only in outline. It was intended to set the benefits of prescribed forms alongside the different benefits of spontaneity. The shorter prayers are drawn from many devotional sources; the longer ones probably represent the author's own style of extempore prayer. The choice of chants is left to the minister, and a psalter by the same compiler is often bound in with the prayers. Actually there are so few responses in the services that if it were not for the psalter there would really be little need for the congregation to have the book in their hands. In the preface an occasional moment of silent prayer is suggested, but with diffidence, as it is "somewhat strange to the usual traditions of social worship." It is a pity that the idea of this book was not carried further. There is need for a prayer-book which, instead of prescribing whole services, provides a large number of litanies and other worship-materials, numbered consecutively like a hymn-book, from which a service could be built up as desired. *The Rodborough Bede-Book* is a rather fanciful effort in this line by a Congregational minister.

12. *Orders of Worship*, 1932. Though some older service-books are still in use, most Unitarian churches in England use either this latest book or an "open" service. Both forms, however, are based upon Anglican Morning Prayer, as can be seen from the sequence of items. The "open" service is usually as regular in form as any printed book, but those who use it keep up the Puritan principle that worship must come spontaneously and not from prescribed phraseology. In *Orders of Worship* the old Calvinist service has quite gone, and even some of the 18th century innovations, still in use in 1862 and later, have disappeared (e.g., responsive openings to services). Its complete dependence on the Book of Common Prayer can be seen from the fact that the items which precede the Lord's Prayer duplicate the items in Cranmer's second book, except that a second collect replaces the absolution. As in Cranmer's book the versicle "O Lord, open thou our lips," the opening of the service in the 6th century, now comes strangely after the service has been proceeding for ten minutes; it is to-day submerged, in geological fashion, by layers of subsequently-added preliminaries, inherited through the Book of Common Prayer.

Orders of Worship is successful because it is a sensible, workmanlike book, which accepts the fact that we have become used to the Anglican order and like a flavour of antiquity; and it satisfies this habit and taste with moderation. Its prayers are well-chosen, and have often been condensed from verbose originals into simplicity and directness. It conforms to current habits rather than to historic principles. Its most obvious ancestor is *Ten Services of Public Prayer*, 1879, Dr. Martineau's revision of the book of 1862, but it follows the Anglican order in some respects more consistently; like Dr. Martineau's book it contains no Communion service, and thus shows that it is Anglicanism of the 18th, not the 16th, century which is the ideal. It also draws on the more modern stages of a move-

ment that began with *A Form of Prayer, etc.*, 1761—the compilation of responsive prayers and acts of worship built upon a single theme. The only remnant of 17th century practice which here survives is the permission in each service for the minister to offer prayer “either extempore, or a selection from the following or other prayers, at his discretion, and as occasion may demand”; this might almost be an echo of the Directory of 1644.

It seems likely that *Orders of Worship* will be the last book of its type, for it is the precipitation of a long process, a moderate, unpartizan, common denominator after the controversies raised by Martineau and the Free Catholic Movement. The next book will probably be built on a new principle.

NOTES ON LITERATURE

An indispensable text-book is *Eucharistic Faith and Practice, Evangelical and Catholic*, by Y. Brilioth, a Swedish Lutheran scholar. Help can also be obtained from *English Prayer Books*, by S. Morrison. *John Knox's Genevan Service Book*, by W. D. Maxwell, a Scots Presbyterian, is an investigation into the origins of Calvinist forms of worship.

The architectural forms are set out, but not clearly, in *The Church Architecture of Protestantism*, by A. L. Drummond. See also the present writer's paper, “The Architecture of the Old Meeting Houses” (*Transactions Unit. Hist. Soc.*, vol. viii, no. 3). *Puritan Architecture*, by M. S. Briggs, is not very helpful historically, but has good illustrations.

The Worship of the English Puritans, by Horton Davies (Dacre Press, 21/-), has just been published. It contains much interesting and useful detail, but the liturgical principles and historical development are not well handled. The author is a Congregationalist, and does not seem quite at home in 17th century Presbyterianism and Anglicanism.

The Prayer Book Reform Movement, by A. E. Peaston, is an excellent digest of the various 18th century liturgies. The author is inclined to measure dependence on the Book of Common Prayer by phraseology rather than by form, and overlooks the fact that the “open” service is itself formal, being at that time based upon the Directory.